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MARK R. PATTERSON*
ABSTRACT
Standard-form contracts are a common feature of commercial
relationships because they offer the advantage of lower transaction
costs. This advantage of standard contracts is increased when there
is a second layer of standardization under which multiple firms
agree on a standard contract. Trade associations and similar entities
often effect standardization of this kind through collective agreement
on a standard contract, sometimes under the aegis of state actors.
Multifirm contract standardization can provide not only the usual
transaction-cost advantages of standard-form contracts, but also
increased competition among firms, because a standard contract
makes comparison among firms’ offerings easier. But standardization among firms also eliminates competition on the standardized
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terms, adding market power to bargaining power and making it less
likely that the needs of all parties will be served.
The collective formation of standard-form contracts has recently
begun to receive academic attention. This attention, however, has for
the most part focused on contract interpretation, emphasizing the
fact of standardization and the nature of the standardizing entity.
Less attention has been paid to issues of contractual fairness.
Moreover, the competitive effects of contract standardization, which
implicate primarily antitrust law, are distinct from those addressed
by contract law. When sellers agree on contract terms, they eliminate
competition among themselves on those terms. This sort of agreement
can be undesirable even if the agreed-upon terms of the contract are
fair and reasonable in themselves, because the standard contract can
eliminate competition among reasonable terms.
Fundamentally, the standardization of contracts is a standardization of the package offered to customers, in much the same way as
is standardization of a product, and antitrust law has often been
skeptical of such standardization. But contract standardization can
also be viewed as altering not the product itself, but the legal
background governing the purchase. Under that view, the contract
simply standardizes the legal backdrop for what otherwise continues
to be a competitive and vigorously bargained transaction. Which of
these perspectives more accurately describes contract standardization
likely differs from case to case, yet the courts generally have considered neither whether competition law should apply differently to
standardization of contracts than to standardization of other
“products” nor whether and how contract law should alter the competition analysis.
This Article addresses the issue of contract standardization by
exploring the interaction of antitrust and contract law in three
basic respects. The first is substantive, focusing on product terms
and considering standardization of terms both to reduce costs
(interoperability standards) and to improve the contract (quality
standards). This focus on terms is consistent with the antitrust
approach of the Department of Justice, which has asked whether
standardization involves “competitively significant” terms, but as the
Article describes this standard is not well defined. The Article then
moves to procedure, considering different contexts in which contract
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standardization occurs and discussing the implications of different
means of negotiation. Third, the Article considers the possibilities
both of voluntary adoption of contracts and of adoption incentives
created by private organizations and by the state. The Article then
draws on these discussions to suggest some analytical approaches to
contract standardization.
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INTRODUCTION
Standard-form contracts are a common feature of commercial
relationships,1 where they offer both advantages and disadvantages.
The primary advantage is a reduction of transaction costs, because
the parties need not negotiate a new contract for each transaction.2
Standard contracts can also provide greater certainty regarding the
meaning of contractual terms3 and a reduction in agency costs.4
Despite these benefits, courts and especially commentators also
express concerns regarding standard contracts.5 Many of these
1. John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 285, 290 (2000) (“[I]n an advanced economy the standard form contract accounts for
more than 99% of all contracts used in commercial and consumer transactions for the transfer
of goods, services and software.”); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic
Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses
and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 864 (2006) (“Virtually every firm that sells goods or
services or extends some form of credit to consumers has certain standard-form contractual
terms governing such things as when and how payment is due, when and if a good can be
returned, whether charges are made for services beyond those originally contracted for, and
other related matters.”).
2. Burke, supra note 1, at 289 (“Efficiency requires firms engaged in the mass production
and distribution of products to develop identical legal contracts regulating their rights and
obligations.”); Steven R. Salbu, Evolving Contract as a Device for Flexible Coordination and
Control, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 329, 376 (1997) (“Standardized language and culture can generate
transaction cost efficiencies by facilitating the trading of contractual rights. The transactional
cost savings that result from standardization of terms are akin to the economies of scale that
are realized in manufacturing when an investment in fixed assets is spread across a large
number of outputs. Like customized production processes, individually tailored contracting
incurs high variable costs that must be renewed with each unit of production. These variable
costs are comprised of the time and resources that must be invested in developing new
contract terms for otherwise familiar transactions, and analyzing these customized terms
whenever a contract is consulted.”) (internal citations omitted).
3. Salbu, supra note 2, at 373 (explaining that a “common, familiar language increases
both one’s acuity of understanding and one’s faith in the quality of that understanding,” which
makes judicial interpretations of standardized contract language more reliable than those of
idiosyncratic language).
4. Id. at 378 (“[S]tandardization of contractual provisions can reduce agency costs by
limiting opportunities for agents to exercise discretion in their own interests.”).
5. See, e.g., Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 565 (Ct. App.
1993); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 124-25 (Ct. App. 1982);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960); 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 18:13 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1993 & Supp. 2009)
(“But in present-day commercial life the standardized mass contract has appeared. It is used
primarily by enterprises with strong bargaining power and position. The weaker party, in
need of the good or services, is frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms,
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concerns arise from the use of standard-form contracts in the
consumer context, where they often are contracts of adhesion that
consumers neither read nor have the power to negotiate.6 Whether
the parties are consumers or businesses, though, a single, standard
contract may not be appropriate for every transaction, so some
parties will not be well-served by contract standardization.7
Both the advantages and the disadvantages of standard contracts
are increased when there is a second layer of standardization. This
additional standardization—the subject of this Article—is present
when a standard contract is not only used by a single seller in
multiple transactions, but also by multiple sellers. Trade associa-

either because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural or artificial) or
because all competitors use the same clauses.” (quoting Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d
144, 147 (Ind. 1971))); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1175 (1983); W. David Slawson,
The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46
U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 23 (1984); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic
Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 531 (1971) (“An unfair form will not deter
sales because the seller can easily arrange his sales so that few if any buyers will read his
forms, whatever their terms, and he risks nothing because the law will treat his forms as
contracts anyway.”). For some more sanguine views on standard-form contracts, see
Symposium, “Boilerplate”: Foundations of Market Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 821 (2006).
6. See, e.g., Brown v. Soh, 909 A.2d 43, 49 (Conn. 2006) (“‘The most salient feature [of
adhesion contracts] is that they are not subject to the normal bargaining processes of ordinary
contracts,’ and they tend to involve ‘standard form contract[s] prepared by one party, to be
signed by the party in a weaker position, [usually] a consumer, who has little choice about
the terms.’” (quoting Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 885 A.2d 734, 745 (Conn. 2005)))
(internal quotation marks omitted); Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer
Assent to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH.
L. REV. 227, 248 (2007); Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
627, 629 (2002) (“If contracts are enforceable promises to do or refrain from doing something,
then one must have actually promised to do or refrain from doing something. True, such
promises are to be judged objectively, but if the promisee knows or has reason to know that
a particular promise went unread then it is unreasonable for the promisee to conclude that
the promisor even objectively manifested assent by signing a form contract or clicking ‘I
agree.’”); Rakoff, supra note 5, at 1177. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler recently conducted an
extensive empirical study of standard contracts used for software licenses, finding that such
contracts are indeed biased in favor of the contract drafters-licensors at least as compared to
contract-law default rules, which more often tend to favor licensees. See Florencia MarottaWurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License
Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677, 713 (2007).
7. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 864-73 (listing several examples, such as hospital bills,
credit-card debt, and mortgage loans, in which consumers benefit significantly from
bargaining around standard-form terms rather than following them).
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tions and similar entities often effect standardization of this kind
through collective agreement on a standard contract, sometimes
under the aegis of state agencies. Multifirm contract standardization can provide not only the advantages noted above, but also
increased competition among firms, because a standard contract
makes comparison among firms’ offerings easier.8 But standardization among firms also eliminates competition on the standardized
terms, adding market power to bargaining power and making it
even less likely that the needs of all parties will be served.
The collective formation of standard-form contracts has recently
begun to receive academic attention.9 The attention, however, has
for the most part focused on contract law, emphasizing the implications for contract interpretation of the fact of standardization
and the nature of the standardizing entity.10 The implications of

8. That is, it is easier to assess the significance of price and quality, for example, if other
terms of a transaction, like contractual payment terms and remedies, are the same.
9. Lisa Bernstein has been writing on related, but distinct, topics for some time. Her
work has focused on private codes created by trade associations. See Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1725 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical
Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 713
(1999); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Merchant Law]. These codes, while not themselves contracts, do sometimes specify default
contractual provisions. See, e.g., NAT’L GRAIN & FEED ASS’N, GRAIN TRADE RULES OF THE
NATIONAL GRAIN AND FEED ASSOCIATION (2010), available at http://www.ngfa.org/files/misc/
web2010_Grain_Trade_Rules.pdf; Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra, at 1772 (describing the
National Grain and Feed Association’s adoption of rules that “cover the basics of contract
formation, performance, repudiation, breach, damages, and excuse”).
To the extent that these codes specify contractual provisions, even as defaults, they can
present the same issues as are discussed here. But the codes could also be viewed as
codifications of already-existing trade rules. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra, at 1772 n.19
(“When the trade rules were originally adopted, custom was the starting point for the
codifiers.”). The actual contracts used by members of the trade associations can still differ, see
id. at 1774 nn.30-31 (noting “battle of the forms” issues arising from differing forms), so it is
not clear how much standardization results.
10. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 9, at 1766 (“This Article draws on a case
study of merchant law in a merchant court to reexamine, and, ultimately, to challenge, the
fundamental premise of the Uniform Commercial Code’s adjudicative philosophy, the idea
that courts should seek to discover ‘immanent business norms’ and use them to decide
cases.”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1145
(2006); Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1075, 1077 (2006); Joseph M. Perillo, Neutral Standardizing of Contracts, 28 PACE L.
REV. 179, 181 (2008).
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collective formation of standard contracts, however, go beyond contract law. Most importantly, any agreement on terms of a transaction raises antitrust issues.11 When sellers agree on contract terms,
they eliminate competition among themselves on those terms.
Whether this elimination of competition leaves contracting parties
worse off depends at least in part upon whether the standardized
terms are important ones and upon whether sellers continue to
compete on other, arguably more important terms like price.
It is important to recognize that these competition issues are
distinct from issues of fairness under contract law. To the extent
that contract law regulates form contracts, it does so primarily
through a focus on oppressive terms.12 The antitrust issue is a different one: that the terms of the standard-form contract are the
product of an agreement, and therefore eliminate competition. This
concern exists even if the agreed-upon terms of the contract are fair
and reasonable in themselves, because the standard contract can
still eliminate competition in the range of reasonableness, that is,
among reasonable terms. As a result of the elimination of alternative terms, the needs of different customers may not be met.
Another layer of complication is introduced when standardization of form contracts is used to perform what might be thought
of as a regulatory function. For example, sellers might agree not to
use particular terms considered to be oppressive. Or the standardization might mandate desirable terms or disclosures. The goals
here are not to reduce transaction costs, or even to promote
efficiency more generally, but to channel contracts and contracting
practices in a particular direction. But standardization for these

11. This aspect of contract standardization has not received much attention in the United
States, but it has been the subject of scholarship in Europe. See Fabrizio Cafaggi, SelfRegulation in European Contract Law, in STANDARD CONTRACT TERMS IN EUROPE: A BASIS FOR
AND A CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 93, 109 (Hugh Collins ed., 2008); Thomas
Wilhelmsson, Cooperation and Competition Regarding Standard Contract Terms in Consumer
Contracts, 17 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 49, 49 (2006). But see Hugh Collins, The Freedom To Circulate
Documents: Regulating Contracts in Europe, 10 EUR. L.J. 787, 800 (2004) (dismissing antitrust
concerns).
12. Contract-law limitations would apply to the extent that the standard contract
introduces terms that are unfair, to use the European terminology, or that violate one of the
analogous, though narrower, U.S. doctrines, such as unconscionability or reasonable
expectations.
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purposes might also violate antitrust law.13 In general, antitrust law
views self-regulation by groups of competitors skeptically, largely
because of a concern that a self-regulating group may be tempted to
adopt rules that exclude their competitors.14
Thus, contract law and competition law may view standardization of standard contracts differently. This Article compares the
approaches to standardization of the various contract doctrines
focusing on unfairness and the antitrust emphasis on competitive
effects. The Article also addresses these issues comparatively by
considering both the United States and Europe. The law in Europe
provides a helpful complement and contrast to that of the United
States because European law focuses on several issues that are
relevant to standardization. Most importantly, the European
Union’s push toward integration of the European economy has led
to the goal of harmonizing European contract law, and standard
contracts have been advanced as one means of achieving such
harmonization.15 The European Union also has a more active and
formal approach to addressing contractual fairness,16 and is engaged
in a larger debate concerning the potential convergence of the
objectives of antitrust law and consumer protection.17
Part I of the Article begins by describing a recent case that
presents an instance of contract standardization and illustrates the
alternative legal approaches to the issue. Part II then outlines
several types of contract standardization, comparing them to the
more familiar product standardization, and describes several significant examples of contract standardization. Part III describes the
relevant competition and contract-law issues from three perspec13. See infra Part III.A.3.
14. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF
STANDARDS SETTING 8 (2004) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS HANDBOOK] (“Because failure to
meet quality standards may limit market acceptance or even result in exclusion from the
market altogether, such standards may represent barriers to market entry, which in turn
could potentially limit consumer options in an anticompetitive manner.”).
15. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication, European Contract
Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward, at 6-8, COM (2004) 651 final (Oct. 11,
2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/
com2004_en.pdf [hereinafter European Contract Law] (discussing standardization of terms
and conditions); see also supra note 11.
16. Council Directive 93/13, 1990 O.J. (L 095) 29, 31 (EEC).
17. See Giorgio Monti, The Revision of the Consumer Acquis from a Competition Law
Perspective, 3 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 295, 295-96 (2007).
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tives: the nature of standard contract terms, the standardization
process, and the freedom or pressure that contracting parties have
in adopting standard contracts. Part IV then proposes some
regulatory approaches to standardized contracts. A Conclusion
offers some final observations.
I. COMPETITION LAW AND CONTRACT LAW
Although a number of cases, both in the United States and in
Europe, have considered standardized standard-form contracts,
there has been surprisingly little analysis focused on the particular
issues raised by such standardization. Moreover, the analysis that
has been presented has been inconclusive, with the courts developing no clear approach to the relationship between competition law
and contract law. The need for greater clarity can be illustrated by
a recent U.S. case.
Litigation against Visa, MasterCard, and their card-issuing banks
in both the United States and Europe has challenged a variety of
their practices as antitrust violations.18 Much of the litigation has
involved bank interchange fees, and in these cases the allegation is
effectively one of price-fixing.19 But in the United States, consumers
have also challenged mandatory arbitration clauses in their cardholder agreements, alleging that banks illegally agreed among
themselves to include these provisions.20 The consumers challenged
these clauses in two suits, one based on contract law and the other
on antitrust law.

18. Actually, such litigation has been even more widespread. See Elizabeth Warren,
Antitrust Issues in Credit Card Merchant Restraint Rules, Tobin Project Discussion Paper,
(May 6, 2007), http://www.tobinproject.org/downloads/RP_Merchant_Restraint_Rules.pdf
(noting litigation in Australia, Argentina, Israel, and Mexico, and investigations in many
other countries).
19. See, e.g., Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008); Paycom
Billing Servs., Inc. v. MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 467 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 2006); Nat’l Bancard Corp.
v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 594 (11th Cir. 1986); In re Visa Check/Mastermoney
Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Commission Decision 2001/782, 2001
O.J. (L 293) 24, 25 (EC).
20. See Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A., 524 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Currency Conversion
Fee Antitrust Litig., 361 F. Supp. 2d 237, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

2010]

STANDARDIZATION OF STANDARD-FORM CONTRACTS

337

The first suit claimed that the standardized contracts were
unenforceable under contract law.21 The plaintiffs argued that
“(1) collusion by defendants renders their agreements unenforceable, and (2) defendants’ collusive behavior was procedurally
unconscionable, which, combined with a waiver of class action
remedies, renders the contracts unenforceable.”22 It is not clear
whether the first argument was that the contracts were unenforceable because they violated federal antitrust law, which would then
preempt state contract law, or that as a matter of contract law itself
the enforcement of contracts obtained through an antitrust violation
is impermissible.
In any event, the district court refused to hold that the contracts
were unenforceable. With respect to the first argument, the court
cited a line of cases in which courts enforced contracts that were
“intelligible economic transactions” separable (in some ill-defined
way) from the alleged antitrust violations.23 The impetus for these
cases seems to be a concern that the plaintiff may be seeking to take
the benefits of the contract and then use antitrust law to avoid
paying its costs. In that case, the plaintiff could conceivably reap a
windfall beyond any antitrust damages it might suffer. The district
court therefore took the view that the contract could be enforced and
that the plaintiffs must bring a separate antitrust claim.24
The second argument was that the alleged antitrust violation
had implications purely within contract law. The court rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument, but not on the ground that collusion did not
constitute procedural unconscionability. Instead, the court took the
common view that both procedural and substantive unconscionability are required,25 and concluded that a waiver of class action
litigation remedies was not substantively unconscionable.26 In
essence, the anticompetitive effect of the act of agreement was not

21. Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 361 F. Supp. 2d at 237.
22. Id. at 258-59.
23. Id. at 259.
24. Id.
25. This issue might be resolved differently in a state that had a more flexible approach
to unconscionability, as some do. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 9.40 (4th ed. 1998) (describing the variety of approaches taken by courts to
unconscionability).
26. Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 361 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
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sufficient to invalidate it under contract law; contract law also
required an inquiry into the substantive terms that resulted from
the agreement.
Following this decision, the plaintiff consumers filed a separate
antitrust action alleging that the same collusion was an antitrust
violation.27 The district court rejected this suit on the grounds that
it was not ripe for adjudication because the plaintiffs had not yet
had a claim that was subject to the arbitration clause. But the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, distinguishing antitrust
harm from contractual harm:
The harms claimed by the cardholders, which lie at the heart
of their Complaint, are injuries to the market from the banks’
alleged collusion to impose a mandatory term in cardholder
agreements, not injuries to any individual cardholder from the
possible invocation of an arbitration clause. The antitrust harms
set forth in the Complaint—for example, the reduction in choice
for consumers, many of whom might well prefer a credit card
that allowed for more methods of dispute resolution—constitute
present market effects that stem directly from the alleged
collusion and are distinct from the issue of whether any cardholder's mandatory arbitration clause is ever invoked. The
reduction in choice and diminished quality of credit services to
which the cardholders claim they have been subjected are
present anti-competitive effects that constitute Article III injury
in fact.28

In other words, the plaintiffs’ harm was the agreed-upon unavailability of contracts without arbitration clauses, not the requirement
of arbitration itself.
That the agreement may constitute an antitrust violation does
not, however, define the evaluative criteria that should be applied.
The court’s reference to the “diminished quality in credit services”29
points in one direction, indicating that it is not simply an agreement
on terms that would result in an antitrust violation; a less desirable
contract would also be required. One wonders, though, whether the
27. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., No. 05 Civ. 7116 (WHP), 2006 WL
2685082, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2006).
28. Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A., 524 F.3d 217, 223-24 (2d Cir. 2008).
29. Id. at 223.
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assessment of the quality of credit services would be made on
average—including both those who do not care whether they are
limited to arbitration and those who do—or if a diminished quality
for any customer would be sufficient to constitute a violation. After
all, the court focused also on the reduction of choice, which seems
to acknowledge the importance of individuals, not just collective
interests.
One also wonders if in light of the court’s focus on the reduction
in choice it would be willing, as the district court was, to see the
arbitration clause as an “intelligible economic transaction”30 independent of the antitrust violation. If not, the court might conclude
that the clause is unenforceable under contract law as well. That is,
if the consumer’s choice of contract is determined by the antitrust
violation, in what sense can or should the contract be viewed as
independent of that violation?
These issues are taken up more specifically in Part III-IV, where
the primary focus is on the proper relationship between contract law
and competition law in this context. First, though, Part II presents
a more systematic description of collective agreements on standardform contracts, and compares this sort of standardization of contracts to the standardization of products, which has been more
commonly addressed by antitrust law.
II. TYPES OF STANDARD-FORM CONTRACTS
The agreements at issue in this Article are in effect standardizations of standards. That is, there is one layer of standardization
in which a firm chooses to use a single form contract in multiple
transactions, and then there is a second layer in which multiple
firms agree among themselves to use the same form contract. In this
Article, the term “standardized contract,” as distinguished from
“standard contract,” will be used to indicate a contract that is the
product of this second layer of standardization.
Two types of variation on the basic scenario are also possible.
First, the counterparties to the firms agreeing on the form contract
may be either individual consumers or other firms. The legal treatment of standard contracts may differ depending on whether the
30. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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contract at issue is between a business and consumers or is between
businesses. The significance of this difference is generally greater
in contract law than it is in competition law, because contract law
is more concerned with differences in bargaining power between the
contracting parties.31 Moreover, within contract law, the involvement of a consumer as one of the contracting parties has more
significance in Europe than it does in the United States.32
Second, the agreement on contract standardization may be made
with some degree of organizational or state direction or supervision.
Although an agreement on the standard can be ad hoc—that is, the
product of a group effort directed solely at that agreement—standardization efforts are more commonly the products of preexisting or
continuing organizations, often trade associations. The involvement
of an organization can have several effects under antitrust law. On
the one hand, an organization is perhaps more likely to have in
place procedural protections that ensure an objective standardsetting process. On the other hand, if membership in an organization is important, and if membership requires adherence to the
standard, the standard may be viewed as more coercive, and thus
possibly more anticompetitive.33
Even more significantly, a standardization effort can take place
under the supervision or mandate of the state. States may have an
interest in contract standardization to police industry behavior or
to ensure certain policies. The European Commission, as noted
above, has proposed the use of standard contract forms as an
31. Rakoff, supra note 5, at 1264-65.
32. For example, the Directive on Unfair Contract Terms applies only to consumer
contracts. See Council Directive 93/13, 1990 O.J. (L 095) 29, 31 (EEC); see also M. Neil Browne
& Jennifer Coon, The Impact of Market Ideology on Transnational Contract Law, 30 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 91, 114 (2008) (explaining how German contract law “seeks to construct
roadblocks for stipulators who try to place undue burden[s] on the consumer in standard form
consumer contracts”); Jane K. Winn & Mark Webber, The Impact of EU Unfair Contract
Terms Law on U.S. Business-to-Consumer Internet Merchants, 62 BUS. LAW. 209, 210 (2006).
There is nothing, however, that would prevent a court from applying similar approaches to
business-to-business contracts. Indeed, in Germany, whose contract law has its own list of
unfair terms for consumer contracts similar to that of the Council Directive (and in fact a
model for the Directive), Collins, supra note 11, at 797, courts have often set aside such terms
in business contracts. See Annick De Boeck & Mark Van Hoecke, The Interpretation of
Standard Clauses in European Contract Law, in STANDARD CONTRACT TERMS IN EUROPE: A
BASIS FOR AND A CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 201, 225-26 (Hugh Collins ed.,
2008).
33. See infra Part III.C.1-2.
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instrument of policymaking.34 State supervision is particularly
important for certain standard contracts, such as those in the
insurance industry, and review by the state can help ensure fair and
procompetitive contracts. But that assumes that a State actively
reviews the contracts at issue. In past instances of joint private
action, state review has at times been cursory or even nonexistent.35
This sort of pro forma state involvement can have significant
negative effects, because it can lessen or eliminate antitrust
scrutiny of the private action under the state action doctrine in the
United States and analogous European doctrines.36
Fundamentally, the standardization of contracts is a standardization of the package offered to customers, in much the same way
as is standardization of a product. Yet the courts generally have
considered neither whether competition law should apply differently to standardization of contracts than to standardization of
other “products” nor whether and how contract law should alter
the competition analysis. The remainder of Part II first describes
several types of standards and then gives examples of standardized
contracts.
A. Product Standards and Contract Standards
Standardization of contracts has both important similarities to
and important differences from standardization of other products.
The literature on product standards typically divides such standards into two general classes: uniformity standards and quality
standards.37 Uniformity standards “assure that two related pro34. See supra text accompanying note 15. In addition to the EU harmonization issue noted
above, see the recent European Commission communication concerning prices and power in
the supply food chain for another example of the use of standard contract forms to further
policy making. Commission of the European Communities, Communication, A Better
Functioning Food Supply Chain in Europe, at 5-7, COM (2009) 591 (Oct. 28, 2009), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication16061_en.pdf (committing explicitly to a participatory procedure concerning standard contract forms).
35. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 631 (1992).
36. See infra Part III.C.3.
37. ABA STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 6-7. This reference actually lists five
categories of standards: quality standards, informational standards, uniformity standards,
interoperability standards, and professional conduct and certification standards. These are
variations on the two basic categories, however. Informational standards and interoperability
standards are types of uniformity standards, and professional conduct and certification
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ducts or processes will fit and/or operate with one another.”38 When
consumers want products to interact, uniformity standards enhance
product value, because conformity with such a standard assures
consumers that the desired interaction will be successful.39 Quality
standards, in contrast, are designed to assure a certain level of
performance. That is, they seek to assure that products perform at
a certain level, without regard to interaction with other products.40
These two types of standards are discussed in more detail below,
with particular reference to contract standards.
1. Uniformity Standards: Transaction Cost Reduction
The most obvious reason for agreement on a standard-form
contract is to lessen the transaction costs associated with contractual negotiation. A uniform standard contract makes it easier for
parties to compare contracts and to switch from one provider to
another, because the parties need not familiarize themselves with
a variety of alternative contracts.41 For example, the agreeing
parties might adopt common language for commonly used terms.42
Or they might enter into substantive agreements on minor terms.43
Agreements of this kind can be analogized to product standardization efforts that are directed to interoperability. The purpose of
product standards directed at interoperability is to define aspects
of product design, like interfaces, that allow products from multiple
manufacturers to work together.44 Such standards are very common
in the electronics and computer industry. Contracts, of course, do
not have to “work together” in the same sense, but the lawyers or
businesspeople negotiating them must work together, and contracts

standards are types of quality standards.
38. Id. at 10 (quoting Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility:
Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 940 (1986)).
39. Daniel J. Gifford, Developing Models for a Coherent Treatment of Standard-Setting
Issues Under the Patent, Copyright, and Antitrust Laws, 43 IDEA 331, 338 (2003).
40. ABA STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 7.
41. David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form
Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and
Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983, 987 (2006).
42. Wilhelmsson, supra note 11, at 56.
43. Id. at 56-57.
44. See ABA STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 10.
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with standard terms provide a common “interface” to ease that
negotiation process and reduce transaction costs.45
In the context of the standardization of products, the benefit of
interoperability is generally viewed as a network effect. A network
effect is present when the value of a good is greater if more people
use it, as is the case for many “network” goods, such as telephones
and the Internet.46 The standardization of a product interface
produces such an effect because it allows individual products to
work with a wide variety of other products. The lowering of contractual negotiation costs discussed above might not, strictly
speaking, be thought of as a network effect, because it does not give
the contract a greater value but instead lowers the cost of using it.
That is, it lowers the effective price of the contract, rather than
increasing the demand for it. Nevertheless, the effect is similar in
that consumer surplus is greater in each case.
Moreover, contract standardization can also increase the inherent
value of the contract in a more direct way: a contract that is more
commonly used is more commonly interpreted by courts, and
therefore is a contract whose meaning and interpretation is more
certain.47 To the extent that a user values this certainty, as most do,
the contract is therefore more valuable even for users who are not
familiar with its terms.48 This effect has been recognized in some
cases involving standard contracts, such as bond indentures:

45. See id. at 9 (discussing “uniformity standards”).
46. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 483 (1998); Patrick D. Curran, Comment, Standard-Setting
Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing, and Per Se Legality, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 983, 987 (2003)
(“The benefits created by network effects can be direct or indirect. A direct benefit is the value
added to the network when additional users join, directly benefiting all network
participants.”).
47. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir.
1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir. 1981); Michelle E. Boardman,
Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1112
(2006) (“Positive network effects can flow from common or boilerplate clauses in any contract.
Widespread, shared contract language is more likely to have taken on a lay meaning, and to
have been previously interpreted, perhaps definitively, by courts. If courts have fleshed out
the application of language, a drafter can be confident about its future application. The value
of contract language can therefore increase as the number of others adopting the language
increases.”).
48. Of course, if courts interpret a standard term in an unexpected way, it may be that
the contract’s value is lessened for a particular party. But the gain in certainty may still exist.
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[U]niformity in interpretation [of bond indenture provisions] is
important to the efficiency of capital markets.... Whereas participants in the capital market can adjust their affairs according
to a uniform interpretation, whether it be correct or not as an
initial proposition, the creation of enduring uncertainties as to
the meaning of boilerplate provisions would decrease the value
of all debenture issues and greatly impair the efficient working
of capital markets. Such uncertainties would vastly increase the
risks and, therefore, the costs of borrowing with no offsetting
benefits either in the capital market or in the administration of
justice. Just such uncertainties would be created if interpretation of boilerplate provisions were submitted to juries sitting in
every judicial district in the nation.49

It is important to remember, though, that the same uniformity
that reduces transaction costs in either products or contracts also
limits consumer choice.50 Uniformity is exactly that: a limitation on
choice. The benefits of contractual uniformity are more likely to
outweigh its harms when contracting parties are uniform as well.
Significant differences among consumers would likely mean differences in contractual preferences, which would make it difficult to
achieve uniformity without denying some consumers their preferences. Of course, standardized contracts can offer menus of choices
rather than single terms, but that lessens the value of the standardization.
Similar points apply to network effects. Network effects provide
increased value, but when they are present, they can also constitute
significant barriers to entry.51 It is difficult for even improved products, like new contractual forms, to establish the informational
benefits that widely adopted and long-used contracts will have. In
that respect, firms and consumers may prefer the known quantity
of an established contract term to a new and apparently better term
whose interpretation is uncertain.
49. Sharon Steel, 691 F.2d at 1048.
50. This effect depends upon the completeness of the standardization. If standard
contracts contain options or menus, they reduce, but do not eliminate, choices and may have
beneficial effects when contracting parties have bounded rationality.
51. Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright
Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 917
(2000) (“Application effects and network effects are similar in that they both create barriers
to entry for competitors and pressure for standardization.”).
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Although it is possible that in the standardization process only
undesirable contract terms will be eliminated, or that the benefits
of uniformity will exceed its costs, it is also possible for standardization to be used by sellers as a practice that constitutes or facilitates
collusion. Indeed, the fact that firms have agreed on a form contract
means not only that they are likely to propose using the contract,
but also that they are less likely to be willing to deviate from it or
even to discuss its weaknesses.52 Moreover, because discussion of,
and competition among, contracts can serve to elicit information
about the underlying transaction to which the contract applies, an
agreement on a contract may make such information more difficult
to obtain. In this respect, the informational aspect of contracts may
cause them to differ from other, more typical products.53
2. Quality Standards: Legal Self-Regulation
Firms may also seek to regulate their conduct in more fundamental ways that are not aimed specifically at uniformity and
transaction costs. For example, they might choose to forbid certain
terms that are arguably unfair from inclusion in the contract. This
sort of agreement would pose questions similar to those that are
presented for product standards when industry groups make efforts
to impose, for example, safety standards. The focus is not on
transaction costs but on what are perceived as socially desirable
goals. The problem, from an antitrust perspective, is that the firms
entering into the agreement and their customers might not have a
uniformly accepted view of what goals are socially desirable.
The argument for the use of quality standards is stronger when
consumers may have difficulty evaluating the alternative products
available. In that case, because the market will not discipline sellers
providing less desirable goods, an agreement on a minimum quality
level may be desirable. For that reason, such standards are often
52. See Mark R. Patterson, Law-Fixing: Should Lawyers Agree How To Interpret Statutes?,
11, 16 (Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.
50, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=555706 (making
similar point regarding an agreement among lawyers on how to interpret a statute).
53. Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of Secondary Purchasers
on the Form of Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 133, 135 (1989); Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 721 (1997).
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seen in the professions, in which the quality of services can be
difficult for laypeople to evaluate. In the business-to-consumer
context, a similar argument could be made that consumers may not
adequately assess contract terms. The problem in this context is not
so much expertise as it is the cost of taking the time to evaluate the
contract, but the principle is the same: protection of consumers may
be desirable.
A particular problem with quality standards is that there is often
no reason why a single firm could not adopt the term individually.
That is, because the goal is not uniformity, but the availability of a
desirable product or contract characteristic, there would generally
be no obstacle to a single firm adopting it unilaterally. Indeed, to
the extent that consumers favor that characteristic, one would
expect sellers to adopt it unilaterally and advertise it. But just as
consumers may not have time to evaluate contracts, they may not
have time to evaluate advertising, especially if the product characteristic at issue is not an important one. Moreover, if the goal is to
have both desirable terms and uniformity, a collective effort may be
necessary.
It is significant that because a contract is not only a business
document but also a legal one, the parties can define their own law
in a way that differs from standardization of the characteristics of
products.54 They might, for example, agree on a deviation from a default contract-law rule, or on the choice of a particular legal regime.
Actually, any quality standard for contracts could be seen as
altering the law in this way, given that contracts define the legal
terms for the transaction. But it is worth distinguishing standardization that achieves uniformity of the legal elements of the contract
from other standardization, which more typically focuses on the
business elements of a transaction.
The benefits of conforming legal rules differ significantly in
Europe and the United States.55 In the European Union, where
54. This is made explicit in the French Civil Code: “Agreements lawfully entered into take
the place of the law for those who have made them.” CODE CIVIL art. 1134 (Fr.), translated at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/code_civil_textA.htm#Section%20I%20%20General%20Prov. Of course, the same provision might be interpreted differently in
different jurisdictions. Still, standardization is likely to narrow the range of such interpretations.
55. See Collins, supra note 11, at 788-89 (“In comparison to the United States, the greater
diversity of laws in Europe may continue to reduce access to markets, if only by creating
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there remains considerable variation in the contract law of the
member states, standard-form contracts can serve to conform
contractual relationships in the different states, at least to the
extent permitted by contract law.56 This conformity of contractual
relationships can in turn serve the goal of market integration of the
European economy.57 Indeed, this benefit of standard contracts has
been a focus of recent communications by the European Commission.58
The United States is different in this respect. Although contract
law is state law, so that formally there are fifty different bodies
of contract law, the law is largely uniform among the states.59 As
a result, standard-form contracts are not generally viewed as a
means of integrating contract law—effecting legal integration,
if you will60—but as an efficient means of reducing transaction
psychological barriers in the form of persistent worries ... arising from unexpected legal
complications occurring in cross-border trade.”).
56. See European Contract Law, supra note 15, at 6 § 2.2.1 (“The second measure sought
to promote the development by private parties of Standard Terms and Conditions (STC) for
EU-wide use rather than just in a single legal order. Currently parties often think they have
to use different sets of STC, due to the existence of differing mandatory requirements in
Member states’ laws, either in contract laws or in other areas of the law.”); cf. Browne & Coon,
supra note 32, at 115 (“One potentially significant effect of consumer protection laws stems
from their demonstrative effect—jurisdictions observe a consumer protection law in another
jurisdiction, promoting the movement of local laws in a similar direction. For example, on
April 5, 1993, the terms of the AGBG were embraced by the European Union (EU) in the
European Community (EC) Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (Directive),
although with some slight modification.”).
57. This assumes, though, that remedying shortcomings in the legal system is a valid goal.
In fact, it is not at all clear, even if it were agreed to be clearly desirable to integrate
European contract law, or to increase U.S. consumer protection law, as discussed below, that
private self-regulation would be the proper approach. Generally speaking, antitrust law, at
least in the United States, takes the approach that private agreement on the terms of doing
business is inappropriate even if those terms would be desirable if they were adopted by
individual firms.
58. See European Contract Law, supra note 15.
59. This uniformity has been achieved by statute in the sale of goods, through widespread
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, but even in other contexts the common derivation
of U.S. contract law from English sources has resulted in great similarity among the laws of
the different states. But see Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Market for
Contracts (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 72, 2007), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/72/.
60. Indeed, a recent U.S. example suggests that parties will not always choose this legal
uniformity. A form contract promulgated by the American Trucking Associations (ATA)
actually results in less uniformity. Uniform law for certain aspects of trucking in the United
States is provided by federal provisions that preempt state law. These provisions are not
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costs—effecting economic integration. In fact, even the transaction-cost-reduction justifications are less compelling in the United
States. Language uniformity and large firms that operate throughout the United States and beyond contribute both to greater
commonality among contracts, even without interfirm standardization, and to lower costs in moving from one contract to another.61
An analogy can be drawn between this sort of “legal standardization” and the use of “code” as an alternative to law in the product
context. As described by Joel Reidenberg and by Lawrence Lessig,
the choice of particular software code for computer-related products
can define and alter the way law is applied:
This code sets the rules of this space; it regulates behavior in
this space; it determines what’s possible here, and what’s not
possible. And as we look to this code maturing, Reidenberg
rightly saw that this code would become its own type of law.
That we could define life in cyberspace as we wanted—with
privacy, or without; with anonymity or without; with universal
access, or without; with the freedom to speak and publish, or
without—and then write what we wanted into the code.62

A standard contract can define contractual options in a similar
way. Of course, the concept is not so novel for contracts, which are
legal documents to begin with, but standardization on legal options
can limit the realm of legal choice for parties in much the same way
as code can limit legal options in cyberspace.
The implications for contract law can be considered in light of the
distinction between mandatory and default contract rules. If we
mandatory, though, and the ATA form contract waives them, thus making state law
applicable. To be sure, the form contract provides its own alternatives, which might
themselves result in a uniform contract, though one different from the uniform federal
version. But the contract also leaves a blank for the parties to specify which state’s laws
apply, which could affect the interpretation of the contract’s provisions. Uniformity appears
not to have been a significant goal in creation of the ATA form. See infra Part II.B.1.
61. See Perillo, supra note 10, at 182 (“The drafting of standard forms by national
enterprises has properly been described as ‘unilateral private ordering of terms imposed by
the dominant party’” (quoting Irma S. Russell, Got Wheels? Article 2A, Standardized Rental
Car Terms, Rational Inaction, and Unilateral Private Ordering, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 137, 138
(2006))).
62. Lawrence Lessig, Keynote Address at Fordham Law School Media Convergence
Conference: Code and the Commons 5 (Feb. 9, 1999), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.
edu/works/lessig/Fordham.pdf.
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assume that the choice between mandatory and default rules in
contract law is a considered one, standardized contracts can distort that choice. By making uniform a particular term, that term
effectively becomes a mandatory one, at least to the extent that
users of the contract decline to renegotiate it.63 This seems especially problematic for terms that go to essentially legal, rather than
business, questions, such as the alteration of the date at which the
statute of limitations begins to run, an instance discussed below.64
In this sense, the legal self-regulation of standardized contracts can
usurp the roles of the legislature and courts.
Simon Whittaker has made this point, suggesting that such
modifications of the law could be viewed in Europe as unfair
contract terms:
Now, it could be said that any European standard terms could
simply not worry too much about these differences but could
instead set a standard position in the contract, reflecting or not
reflecting the default positions in national laws. But how would
this work? Where the applicable law does not itself take a
default position on the issue in question, then, in principle, the
term would be given effect, but where the applicable law does
take a default position, then the term’s effect would immediately
run into difficulty. Unless its substance were identical to the
default rule, it would look like a contractual exclusion or
modification of the law and, therefore, be potentially vulnerable
under national laws governing unfair contract terms or other
mandatory rules.65

Whether such alterations in default contract rules would be viewed
in the United States as unfair, or unconscionable, is not clear, but
alteration of mandatory rules certainly seems problematic, particularly when contracting parties may not be aware of the rules.66

63. Even if the parties do choose to negotiate a change to a standard contract, the
standard’s agreed-upon choice of the default rule can be important. See infra text
accompanying note 260.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 166-72.
65. Simon Whittaker, On the Development of European Standard Contract Terms, in
STANDARD CONTRACT TERMS IN EUROPE: A BASIS FOR AND A CHALLENGE TO EUROPEAN
CONTRACT LAW 150 (Hugh Collins ed., 2008).
66. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 186-91.

350

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:327

B. Examples of Standardized Contracts
The following paragraphs briefly describe several examples of
standardized contracts. The purpose here is not to discuss these
contracts in detail, but merely to introduce them. The implications
of the contracts and their standardization are discussed later in the
Article.
1. American Trucking Associations
The American Trucking Associations (ATA) is a trade association
of trucking companies. The ATA recently promulgated a model
carrier-broker contract—actually, two contracts, a short one and a
long one—to govern the relationship between motor carriers, or
trucking companies, and the brokers that make the arrangements
under which those carriers transport goods for shippers.67 The ATA
presented the model contracts as alternatives to another model
contract proposed by the Transportation Intermediaries Association
(TIA),68 an organization whose members include the brokers who
are the parties on the other side of the carrier-broker transaction
from the members of the ATA:
The ATA model contracts follow the release earlier this
summer of a TIA-developed model motor carrier/broker agreement. ATA has previously cautioned its members that it believes
that the TIA model, which has not undergone DOJ antitrust
review, favors in many instances the interests of brokers and
shippers over that of motor carriers.69

The main point of contention between the ATA and the TIA,
judging from the ATA press release, appeared to be that “the TIA
model asks motor carriers to agree that the broker ‘is the sole party
responsible for payment of carrier’s charges’ and contains an
67. Am. Trucking Ass’n, ATA Unveils Model Motor Carrier/Broker Agreements (Aug. 15,
2006), http://www.truckline.com/Advissues/Litigation/Pages/Carrier%20Broker%20
Agreements.aspx.
68. Transp. Intermediaries Ass’n, Transportation Intermediaries Association Introduces
Model Broker-Carrier Contract, BUSINESS WIRE, June 5, 2006.
69. Am. Trucking Ass’n, ATA Unveils Model Motor Carrier/Broker Agreements, supra
note 67.
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absolute prohibition against motor carriers seeking payment of
freight charges from a shipper that has paid a broker.”70 One
industry commentator pointed out the risk that this approach poses
for brokers.71 Moreover, he asserted that this may have disparate
effects on large and small brokers:
This possibility of a major customer default is the reason
numerous sophisticated brokers will not guarantee payment of
freight charges incurred for the account of Rust Belt shippers
with junk bond status. Smaller brokers should recognize the
credit risk involved in guaranteeing payments notwithstanding
shipper insolvency and the possibility of offset.72

From this perspective, it appears possible that the TIA model
puts small brokers at a distinct disadvantage, because they are
assuming the credit risk of the shippers. Larger brokers are
presumably better able to assume that risk than are smaller
brokers. Interestingly, though, it is not clear what position the ATA
agreement adopts on this issue. The ATA agreement states that “it
shall be Broker’s responsibility to remit freight charges owed to
Carrier ..., regardless of any late payment or nonpayment to Broker
by Shippers.”73 This provision does not prevent the carrier from
seeking payment from the shipper, but, like the TIA agreement, it
makes the broker responsible for payment regardless of whether the
shipper has paid.74 In that respect, the ATA model continues to
leave the brokers at risk, but it also provides that shippers continue
to be liable, or at least does not clearly provide otherwise.
More importantly, perhaps, the ATA agreement does not provide
contracting parties with various options on this term, or highlight
the issues that are the subject of disagreement, but instead merely
applies the provision quoted above.75 That approach seems intended
70. Id.
71. Henry E. Seaton, Who Pays the Freight? (Jan. 2007), http://www.transportationlaw.
net/articles/jan07article.html.
72. Id.
73. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Model Motor Carrier/Broker Agreement § 3.2(c), http://www.
truckline.com/AdvIssues/Litigation/Pages/Carrier%20Broker%20Agreements.aspx (follow
“Model Motor Carrier-Broker Agreement” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) [hereinafter
ATA Model Motor Carrier/Broker Agreement].
74. Id. § 3.2.
75. Id.
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more to ensure that carriers are protected than to ensure that the
parties carefully consider their positions on what seems clearly to
be a competitively significant term. The failure to provide or explain
options is especially significant because a previous ATA model
agreement for agreements between carriers and shippers provided
commentary for its various sections outlining alternative provisions.76
2. American Institute of Architects
One of the more prominent instances of collectively created
standard-form contracts in the United States is that of the
American Institute of Architects (AIA). The AIA is the “dominant”
provider of building design and construction documents, and
supplies a wide range of documents that are commonly used in the
construction industry.77 It provides both form contracts that primarily involve provision of architectural services and contracts that
primarily involve other relationships, such as contracts for use by
building contractors and property owners.78
Although the AIA promotes its contracts as balanced,79 Justin
Sweet notes several ways in which the AIA’s documents are
designed to protect the financial interests of architects.80 AIA
contracts also pose some other interesting contractual issues:
What many owners, contractors, and other users of AIA forms
do not realize, however, is that the form contract they sign also
binds them to approximately 50 additional pages of “general
conditions” incorporated by reference into the contract. AIA
Document A201, which contains these general conditions, is
rarely attached to the contract that is signed—and, in fact, must
be purchased separately from the AIA. Unfortunately, many
parties discover the existence of the A201, and the additional
76. See Am. Trucking Ass’n, Model Truckload Motor Carrier/Shipper Agreement with
Commentaries, http://www.truckline.com/AdvIssues/Litigation/Carrier%20Shipper%20
Agreements/Model%20Agreement.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
77. Justin Sweet, Essay, The American Institute of Architects: Dominant Actor in the
Construction Documents Market, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 317.
78. See Am. Inst. of Architects, Document Synopses by Family, http://www.aia.org/
contractdocs/aias076693 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
79. See infra text accompanying note 217.
80. Sweet, supra note 77, at 320, 330-31.
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terms therein, only when there is a dispute. At that point, the
parties learn that they agreed to very specific procedures related
to change orders, insurance, dispute resolution, and payment—
procedures they may not have previously contemplated much
less agreed to had they been aware that such terms existed.81

The AIA has made some changes to the contracts in recent years,
but among the AIA contracts’ problematic provisions have been
requirements of mandatory arbitration,82 alteration of the statute
of limitations,83 and waivers of consequential damages.84 Although
these provisions may not always be inappropriate, to the extent that
they favor architects, they may raise questions about the AIA’s
standardization.
Other AIA contracts are also sometimes subject to criticism. For
example, a “prominent” lawyer-architect recently objected to several
AIA contracts, which he said have flaws regarding “issues of indemnity, mutual waivers of claims, and insurance.”85 The lawyer also
“[took] issue with the makeup of the [contractually-created entity’s]
governance board because it not only guarantees the owner majority
control ... but it also may violate licensing laws in some states.”86 In
response, the AIA indicated its view that the contracts were
satisfactory, but said also that “the AIA knew the documents would
be ‘thought-provoking.’”87
3. Insurance Services Office
In the United States, much of the work of generating insurance
policy forms is done by the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO), an

81. C. Daniel Lins, AIA General Conditions: What You Don’t Know Might Hurt You,
http://www.mglaw.net/2008/08/aia-general-conditions-what-you-don’t-know-might-hurt-you/
(last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
82. Id.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 166-72.
84. Id.; see also AIA Contract Documents: Of Antelopes and Alligators—The AIA A201
Waiver of Consequential Damages from the Owner’s Perspective and Other Troubling Tales,
http://www.acrel.org/Documents/Seminars/a002113(1).pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
85. Nadine M. Post, IPD Contracts Draw Criticism from Lawyer, ARCHITECTURAL REC.,
June 15, 2009, http://archrecord.construction.com/news/daily/archives/090615ipd.asp.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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association of insurers.88 The ISO is an organization somewhat
similar to the AIA and performs a variety of functions for the insurance industry, among them the preparation of model insurance
policies.89 With each policy, ISO provides actuarial and rating
data,90 all of which make it very efficient for insurers to use ISO
forms. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that “[m]ost ISO members cannot afford to continue to use a form if ISO withdraws these
support services.”91
ISO is owned in large part by insurers, so that its operation could
be viewed as an agreement among those insurers. Its contractdevelopment process, however, can have input from other industry
participants:
The ISO drafting process is reminiscent of the legislative
process, with input from interest groups and regulators, and
collaborative drafting, comment receipt, and revision. The
revision of standard form policies is akin to amendment of
legislation. The issuance of a new endorsement to meet a new
problem (e.g., the total exclusion of asbestos or pollution
coverage) has elements of amendment, the promulgation of a
new regulation, or an agency opinion.92

Of course, it is not like legislation if the insurers, rather than
legislators, control the process. In fact, an antitrust suit in the late
1980s alleged that the involvement of insurers in the ISO’s preparation of form contracts was an antitrust violation. The suit was
settled by the insurers with the State of Texas with an agreement
that insurers would no longer have decision-making power regarding policy language, though ISO could still “consult” with them.93
88. There are other similar but smaller organizations, such as the American Association
of Insurance Services. 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 4.05[A]
(3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2010).
89. Id.
90. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993).
91. Id.
92. 1 STEMPEL, supra note 88, § 4.05[A].
93. Eric N. Berg, Four Big Insurers Settle Texas Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1991,
at D2 (“The Insurance Services Office will change its policy forms decision-making process
nationwide as a result of an antitrust suit settlement reached with Texas state officials. ‘ISO
agrees that decision-making authority in ISO with respect to all Policy Forms that are filed
or to be filed in Texas shall be exercised by ISO staff,’ rather than by participating ISO
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Indeed, insurers have sought to retain influence over the ISO. In
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, a 1993 case, the Supreme
Court considered efforts to force the use of insurance policy forms
with particular terms.94 The ISO had proposed to offer two alternative forms, one for what was at the time the traditional “occurrence”
policy and another for a “claims-made” policy.95 Several insurers
objected and organized a boycott of the ISO forms, enlisting
reinsurance companies in the boycott as well.96 As a result, the ISO
responded to some of the insurers’ demands.97
The Court had no trouble concluding that the boycotters’ conduct
was anticompetitive. The conduct, however, was arguably exempt
from antitrust scrutiny under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which
provides that the antitrust laws apply to “the business of insurance”
only “to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
Law.”98 Because insurance generally is regulated by state law, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act largely exempts insurance from antitrust
scrutiny.99 There is an exception to the Act, however, that makes
antitrust law applicable “to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or
intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.”100 The Court
concluded that the allegations were sufficient to make out a claim

insurers, according to the settlement agreement.”).
94. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 770-71.
95. Id. at 773.
96. Id. at 775.
97. Id. at 775-76.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006). The Court considered whether the conduct alleged might
have been a “boycott,” which is an exemption to the antitrust immunity conferred by the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 780-81; see also UNR Indus., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins.
Co., 607 F. Supp. 855, 862-63 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“Therefore, the conspiracy to refuse to issue
occurrence policies, while it might violate the antitrust laws as a concerted refusal to deal, is
exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.”); Pierucci v. Cont’l Cas.
Co., 418 F. Supp. 704, 707 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (dismissing complaint alleging that insurers
“fix[ed] the terms of [insurance] policies” because state law provided for approval of policies,
and therefore complaints about policy terms should have been made to state regulators).
99. As discussed subsequently in the text, infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text,
many argue that insurance should receive more antitrust scrutiny. See also ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 2 (Michael Blankshain ed., 2d ed. 2006)
[hereinafter ABA INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK] (“Legislators at both the national and
state levels have made efforts to significantly increase the insurance industry’s exposure to
the antitrust laws.”).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b).
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of a boycott that would subject the insurers’ conduct to the antitrust
laws.101
As a result of the procedural posture of the case, though, the
Court was not called upon to provide a full antitrust analysis of the
effect of the standardization. It did not, for example, need to decide
whether the standardization would have been anticompetitive had
the ISO not been coerced to make the changes. In other words, it
might have been the coercion that was the anticompetitive act, so
that it would have been anticompetitive regardless of the competitive effect of the standardization itself. In any event, in the absence
of the coercive boycott, the standardization would have been exempt
from antitrust scrutiny under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.102
In fact, though, many view the ISO contracts as both unfavorable
to policyholders and difficult to understand. This was especially
apparent in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in
2005. One of the primary legal issues that arose following Katrina
was whether the exclusion in the ISO policies for damage from
“flood” included damage from the breached levees in New Orleans.
Although a district court concluded that damage from the breached
levees was covered,103 the court of appeals disagreed, concluding
that flood damage was excluded “unambiguously.”104 Neither court
addressed any significance of the drafting of the policies by the
ISO.105
Katrina increased the calls for repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, and those calling for the repeal sometimes point to the ISO as
a source of anticompetitive effects. For example, in Senate testimony, J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance for the Consumer
Federation of America, pointed to what he called “collusive activities” by “[c]artel-like organizations, such as the Insurance Services
Office.”106 Those who call for repeal generally do not believe that
101. Hartford, 509 U.S. at 780.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b).
103. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 466 F. Supp. 2d 729, 765 (E.D. La. 2006),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 495 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 2007).
104. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 2007).
105. Nor did other courts considering Katrina-related insurance issues. See, e.g., Leonard
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2007). But see Jay S. Goldbaum, Comment,
Katrina and Beyond: Judicial Treatment of Boilerplate Language in Standardized Insurance
Contracts, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 453, 460-72.
106. The McCarran-Ferguson Act: Implications of Repealing the Insurers’ Antitrust
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state regulation is adequate. In the testimony referred to above,
Hunter called the Act “a truly astounding piece of legislation,” not
only because it largely exempts insurers from antitrust laws, but
also because it does not establish any other forms of oversight by the
federal government on state regulation.107
III. COMPETITION AND CONTRACT ANALYSIS
Competition law and contract law have both commonalities and
differences. Both, for example, reflect fundamental concerns about
efficiency. A focus on efficiency is more evident in antitrust law, in
which economic efficiency is the touchstone.108 Contract-law decisions do not emphasize efficiency so explicitly, but much contract
scholarship is directed at evaluating the efficiency vel non of
contract rules.109 On the other hand, contract law’s emphasis on
consent and self-determination by contracting parties is not a focus
of antitrust law, which instead places limits on parties’ freedom of
action.
The two bodies of law might view the same conduct differently.
For example, an agreement to eliminate unfair contract terms
would likely be viewed favorably under contract law, but it could be
seen as anticompetitive under antitrust law,110 which focuses more
Exemption: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement
of J. Robert Hunter, Director of Insurance, Consumer Federation of America), available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/Antitrust%20Senate%20McCarran%20Repeal%20
Testimony%202007%20(2).pdf.
107. Id. at 1.
108. See, e.g., Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir.
1986) (“[T]he emphasis of antitrust policy shifted from the protection of competition as a
process of rivalry to the protection of competition as a means of promoting economic
efficiency.”); Hillary Greene, Antitrust Censorship of Economic Protest, 59 DUKE L.J. 1037,
1040 (2010) (observing that “[a]ntitrust law,” has a “primary emphasis on economic efficiency”).
109. Contract law also arguably has concerns that go beyond efficiency, at least in Europe.
See Study Group on Social Justice in European Private Law, Social Justice In European
Contract Law: A Manifesto, 10 EUR. L.J. 653, 664-67 (2004) (contending that “fairness,” or
distributive justice, is part of EU law).
110. If such an agreement were entered into by businesses in a way that benefited
consumers, it might be viewed as procompetitive, especially if the terms could be viewed as
the product of a market failure. But if the agreement were entered into by the consumers who
would benefit from the change, it might be viewed as anticompetitive, and antitrust law would
take a less favorable view.
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on the competitive process than on the fairness of results.111
Conversely, an agreement that produced more competitive benefits
than harms would generally pass antitrust scrutiny, but to the
extent that it resulted in a contract of adhesion, it might be viewed
unfavorably by contract law, as for example under the unconscionability doctrine in the United States or unfairness regulation
in Europe.
There are also several ways that the two bodies of law could
interact in evaluating standardized contracts. For example, it might
be that one body of law would provide rules that altered the legality
of conduct under the other. Suppose a group of sellers agreed on a
contract that eliminated a particular term that was unfavorable to
buyers. From an antitrust view, it is possible that this could be
viewed as procompetitive, assuming the benefits to buyers outweighed any competitive harms.112 But then suppose that the
eliminated term would have been unenforceable under contract law.
In that case, it is less clear that there would be any real benefits to
be obtained by the agreement.
To take another example, a few cases have indicated that contracts or contractual terms that have been standardized in an
industry should be interpreted uniformly.113 To the extent that this
rule were applied to an arguably unfair contract, it could make
enforcement of that contract more likely. On the other hand,
uniformity does not imply enforceability: perhaps such a contract
should be interpreted uniformly by striking it down in every
instance. In fact, though, some courts have found the widespread
use of a term a factor that points away from unconscionability. If
contract law will apply a lower level of scrutiny to a standardized
contract, that makes the role of antitrust law even more important.
Beyond the few cases that have advocated uniform interpretations, though, the courts have not devoted significant attention to
111. See, e.g., United States v. W. Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp. 668, 672 (D.D.C. 1983)
(“[Antitrust] laws are intended to protect the competitive process, not to assure positive
results for competitors.”).
112. That is the usual antitrust standard, but it is possible that the creation of a “new”
contract would be treated even more deferentially. See Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpter
v. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 597 n.62 (2007) (observing
that “[a]ntitrust courts have arguably adopted a rebuttable presumption that new products
or processes do not harm competition so long as they confer some benefits to buyers”).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
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interpretation of even widely used standardized contracts. With
respect to the American Institute of Architects (AIA) contracts, for
example, which are perhaps the most widely used standardized
contracts, Professor Sweet says that “relatively few reported
appellate decisions can be said to provide guides as to how AIA
selected language will be interpreted.”114 It is therefore somewhat
difficult to predict how contract law will interact with antitrust law
in this area.
It is also true that there are few decisions considering the antitrust aspects of standardizing contracts. In the cases addressing
product standards, the alleged injuries have generally been to
competitors excluded from the market.115 Although such injuries
could be an issue for standardized contracts as well, there may also
be harm to the counterparties to a contract when the parties on one
side standardize the contract. As a result, it is not clear to what
extent the approaches taken in challenges to product standards can
be extrapolated to standard contracts.
The following material seeks to address the issue of contract
standardization specifically by exploring the interaction of antitrust
and contract law in this area. Part III.A focuses on product terms,
considering standardization of terms both to reduce costs (interoperability standards) and to improve the contract (quality standards).
Part III.B then focuses on the process of standardizing a contract
and discusses the implication of different means of negotiation. Part
III.C then addresses the question of adoption of standard contracts,
and considers the possibilities both of voluntary adoption of contracts and of adoption incentives created by private organizations
and by the state.
A. Substance: Price-Fixing v. Standardization
Generally speaking, antitrust law does not favor horizontal
agreements on sales terms. Although the Supreme Court has not
considered a case focusing on agreement on a contract in many

114. Sweet, supra note 77, at 324.
115. Although standardization could cause harm to consumers (and presumably would,
even in a case brought by an injured competitor), there have been relatively few cases brought
by consumers.
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years,116 its decision in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., was
somewhat similar.117 In Catalano, the plaintiffs, beer retailers,
alleged that a group of beer wholesalers had agreed to eliminate
short-term trade credit on their purchases.118 The Ninth Circuit had
refused to apply a per se rule and instead required a showing of
anticompetitive effect:
An agreement to fix credit, a “nonprice” condition of sale, may
actually enhance competition. Proper analysis reveals “that
an agreement fixing nonprice trade items may either help or
hurt competition, depending upon industry structure.” ...
[C]ompetition could be fostered by the increased visibility of
price made possible by the agreement to eliminate credit. For
example, an agreement to eliminate credit might foster competition by increasing the visibility of the price term, and hence,
promote open price competition in an industry in which imperfect information shielded various sellers from vigorous competition.119

The Supreme Court disagreed, however, reasoning that “[a]n
agreement to terminate the practice of giving credit is thus tantamount to an agreement to eliminate discounts, and thus falls
squarely within the traditional per se rule against price fixing.”120
116. The most recent case specifically challenging standardization of a contract was
Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930), aff’g 34 F.2d 984
(S.D.N.Y. 1929). In that case, the U.S. government challenged an agreement among movie
distributors under which they agreed to do business with exhibitors only under a “Standard
Exhibition Contract.” Id. at 37. Among other provisions in the contract was an arbitration
provision that was the primary focus of the antitrust challenge. United States v. Paramount
Famous Lasky Corp., 34 F.2d 984, 985-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). The Supreme Court concluded that
agreement on the provision was an antitrust violation, stating that “[t]he Sherman Act seeks
to protect the public against evils commonly incident to the unreasonable destruction of
competition and no length of discussion or experimentation amongst parties to a combination
which produces the inhibited result can give validity to their action.” Paramount Famous
Lasky, 282 U.S. at 43. In determining that the provision injured competition, the Court
appeared to rely on the fact that it was, in the Court’s word, “unusual.” See id. (stating that
the arrangement “cannot be classed among ‘those normal and usual agreements in aid of
trade and commerce’ spoken of in Eastern States Lumber Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600,
612 (1914)”).
117. 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (per curiam).
118. Id. at 643.
119. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 605 F.2d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting L.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 99, at 277 (1977)).
120. Catalano, 446 U.S. at 648.
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The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the restraint would
lead to greater price transparency:
Nor can the informing function of the agreement, the increased
price visibility, justify its restraint on the individual wholesaler’s
freedom to select his own prices and terms of sale. For, again, it
is obvious that any industrywide agreement on prices will result
in a more accurate understanding of the terms offered by all
parties to the agreement.... [T]here is a plain distinction between
the lawful right to publish prices and terms of sale, on the one
hand, and an agreement among competitors limiting action with
respect to the published prices, on the other.121

The implications of Catalano for contract standardization are not
clear. It seems likely that the credit restriction agreed upon in
Catalano is not a term that would be favored either by contract law
as fair or by antitrust law as procompetitive. Perhaps if the agreedupon term had been more favorable, the Court would have viewed
the case differently. On the other hand, the Court seemed to cast a
broad net of condemnation: “It is more realistic to view an agreement to eliminate credit sales as extinguishing one form of competition among the sellers.”122 If eliminating any element of competition
among sellers is a per se antitrust violation, then it would seem that
any standardization of contract would be illegal, even when it
reduces transaction costs and improves the quality of bargaining. In
fact, though, the courts and agencies have generally been much
more receptive to contract standardization.123
There are alternative ways to view standard contracts. Those who
would view contracts as commodities provide support for the
Supreme Court’s approach in Catalano.124 In that view, a contract
is simply part of the product that is sold to the buyer.125 Competition
among sellers on contractual provisions, then, is just one aspect
of product competition, and agreement on a contract would be
121. Id. at 649-50.
122. Id. at 649.
123. See infra Part III.C.
124. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 1; Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The
Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the Form of Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 133 (1989);
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970).
125. See Burke, supra note 1, at 287.
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equivalent to agreement on the definition of a product. In contrast,
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati have recently argued that standard
contracts should be interpreted as if they were statutes.126
These two views—standard contracts as part of the purchased
product and standard contracts as part of the legal background
governing the purchase—are presented in the literature as alternative conceptions, but the distinction might better be viewed as a
question of fact. Some standardized contracts might indeed reflect
efforts to standardize the terms of the transaction, which could be
anticompetitive. Others, though, might simply be aimed at standardizing the legal backdrop for what would otherwise continue to
be a vigorously bargained transaction.
1. Agreement on Price and Related Terms
Many of the cases that have addressed standardized contracts
fall clearly into the price-fixing category.127 In fact, a significant
proportion of the decided cases challenging agreements on contracts have not involved true standardization efforts.128 Instead,
these cases have involved simple agreements on sales terms,
such as price, where the agreement was then memorialized or
effected through a standard contract.129 In these cases, there was
not a colorable argument for the efficiency of standardization.130
Therefore, the cases have correctly treated the agreements as per se
illegal price-fixing agreements.
A prominent example involved the Dramatists Guild’s long-term
effort to encourage use of a standard contract.131 The Guild promotes
126. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 10.
127. See, e.g., Estate of Garrison v. Warner Bros., Inc., Civ. No. CV 95-8328 RMT, 1996 WL
407849, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 1996) (involving a claim in which plaintiffs alleged the
defendants had violated the Sherman Act by price-fixing and refusing to deal with talent who
had entered into “standard net profits contracts”).
128. See, e.g., id.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 132-33.
130. In one sense, price-fixing is always efficient, because it saves the cost of negotiating
on price, but the efficiency does not outweigh the anticompetitive effect of price-fixing.
131. The most recent case addressing this effort is Barr v. Dramatists Guild, Inc., 573 F.
Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (discussing whether the Dramatists Guild’s internal agreement not
to license a play except upon the terms of a form contract violates antitrust laws). See also
Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1945) (reversing the trial court’s dismissal of an action
for treble damages under the Sherman Act because requiring producers to sign the Guild’s
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a “Minimum Basic Production Contract” (MBPC) and has been
subject to allegations that the Guild and individual playwrights
“have conspired to fix the minimum prices and other terms on which
they will deal with producers and have agreed among themselves
that they will not license a play to producers except upon the
minimum terms incorporated in a standard form contract [the
MBPC].”132 The effort to improve terms for playwrights even
resulted in the unsuccessful introduction of the Playwrights
Licensing Antitrust Initiative Act of 2004, which if passed would
have provided that “the antitrust laws shall not apply to any joint
discussion, consideration, review, action, or agreement for the
express purpose of, and limited to, the development of a standard
form contract containing minimum terms of artistic protection and
levels of compensation for playwrights.”133
Some similar cases have considered contract standardization
efforts that were conducted in association with agreements on
price.134 In such cases, the courts have sometimes treated the
agreement on other contract terms as intended to prevent the
agreeing firms from cheating on their price agreement.135 As such,
the anticompetitive effect of the standardization of the form
contracts is clear, and it seems unlikely that any procompetitive
effects could be sufficiently great to outweigh the anticompetitive
ones. There appears to be no reported case in which it has been
argued that an agreement on a form contract was sufficiently
procompetitive to compensate for the effects of price-fixing.136 Nor is
form contract is prima facie evidence of restraint of trade).
132. Barr, 573 F. Supp. at 557.
133. S. 2349, 108th Cong. § 2(a) (2004). The Act would have exempted not just the
development of a standard contract, but also “reaching a collective agreement among
playwrights adopting a standard form contract developed pursuant to subsection (a) as the
participating playwrights sole and exclusive means by which participating playwrights shall
license their plays to producers.” Id. § 2(b).
134. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d
573, 580-81 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding defendant engaged in standardized futures contracts and
also set prices for its products according to the then-prevailing market rates).
135. See, e.g., Hyland v. Homeservices of Am., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-612-R, 2008 WL 4858202,
at *1 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 7, 2008) (noting, while granting class certification to plaintiffs, that
plaintiffs had argued that defendants provided similar, “virtually standardized services” and
exerted influence over a state real estate commission to maintain an antirebate rule to help
prevent defendants from cheating on their price-fixing agreement).
136. In theory, the benefits of standardization of nonprice terms could outweigh the costs
of price-fixing even when there is an actual price-fixing agreement. That could be true, for
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it obvious how such standardization would be ancillary to the pricefixing; it seems unlikely that an agreement on price is necessary to
the achievement of the cost savings from standardization of other
terms. Here, too, per se treatment is appropriate.
But not all contract standardization efforts are associated with
efforts to fix price. As Choi and Gulati’s approach suggests, one can
view standard contracts as part of the legal background against
which price and nonprice competition takes place.137 The agreement
on this legal background by market participants, rather than its
adoption by a legislature, is a source of concern, though, and is
cause for antitrust scrutiny. As the Supreme Court said in its most
recent standard-setting case, “[t]here is no doubt that the members
of [standard-setting] associations often have economic incentives to
restrain competition and that the product standards set by such
associations have a serious potential for anticompetitive harm.”138
2. Uniformity: Agreement on Minor Terms
Agreement upon a uniformity standard is unlikely to be viewed
as procompetitive unless the agreed-upon terms are minor.
Although it is possible that the elimination of competition on
significant terms could be procompetitive, that seems somewhat
implausible. It would probably require that the cost of comparing
those terms outweigh the benefits obtained from the availability of
alternatives. This situation seems unlikely, especially because
buyers need not compare alternatives in which they are not
interested; they presumably would only incur the costs of comparison when they anticipated value from the effort.139
example, if prices were within a very narrow range prior to the standardization, yet
consumers spent considerable time analyzing insignificant nonprice differences among
contracts. In that case, the elimination of price competition might cost the buyer little, but the
elimination of the cost of comparing nonprice terms could provide significant savings. (Think
about trying to determine which of thirty brands of toothpaste to buy.) But such a prospect
seems sufficiently unlikely to argue for a deviation from per se treatment.
137. Choi & Gulati, supra note 10, at 1131-33.
138. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988).
139. In theory, buyers could be mistaken about the value of comparison shopping, thinking
it valuable when it is not. But again that seems implausible, and in any case it is not clear
that antitrust law would accept an argument that sellers were protecting buyers from
misguided comparison shopping. On this, see infra text accompanying notes 175-80,
discussing National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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The most likely argument for antitrust legality of an agreement
on contract terms would be that any anticompetitive effect of the
elimination of competition on those terms is outweighed by more
effective bargaining on the remaining, more significant terms. It is
true that this argument is much the same as one made by the
defendants in Catalano and rejected by the Supreme Court.140
Nevertheless, it is the basic competitive justification for uniformity
standards, and is likely to succeed for at least some standardized
contracts, particularly if the agreed-upon terms are less significant
than the credit restriction in Catalano.
In a recent business review letter, the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) took an approach that focused on the
asserted minor nature of the agreed-upon terms.141 The letter
reviewed the model carrier-broker contracts142 that were promulgated by the American Trucking Associations (ATA). The DOJ
stated that it had no intention of challenging the proposed model
contracts, observing that “[t]he model agreements do not contain
any provisions specifying rates to be charged or other competitively
significant terms.”143
As suggested above, however, it is not clear that all of the
standardized terms are minor.144 The ATA model contracts were
presented as an alternative to the competing model contract
proposed by the TIA, whose members are on the other side of the
contract from those of the ATA.145 The ATA agreement takes a
different position from the TIA’s on the central point of disagreement suggesting that the contracting parties, who presumably are
best informed regarding their contracts, believe that the issue is
important.146 Moreover, as discussed above, a possible effect of the
140. See supra text accompanying notes 117-21.
141. Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Kenneth P. Ewing, Steptoe & Johnson LLP 2 (Aug. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/217742.pdf [hereinafter Barnett Letter]
(regarding ATA’s proposed model contract).
142. See supra Part II.B.1.
143. Barnett Letter, supra note 141, at 2. The agency also noted that “use of the
agreements or any of their provisions will be left to the determination of each company acting
independently.” Id. This issue of the voluntary nature of adoption of the standard contract will
be taken up below. See infra Part III.C.1.
144. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (noting that unlike the TIA Model Contract,
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TIA version would be to put small brokers at a competitive disadvantage, which indicates that the issue is one of antitrust significance.147
The DOJ’s business review letter does not address any of these
issues. The letter simply relies on the statement quoted above
regarding the absence of “competitively significant terms.”148 The
DOJ’s approach puts its phrase “competitively significant” at the
center of the analysis, and the meaning of that phrase is not clear.
It might mean that a term is one with respect to which firms are in
fact not competing significantly. That is, it might mean that the
firms’ terms are already identical. If so, it is not clear that there
would be a need for, or a benefit from, standardization.149 And even
if there would be value in standardization, it also raises the
question of what the DOJ’s basis is for its determination of competitive significance.150
The letter does not suggest that the DOJ conducted an independent assessment of the competitive significance of the standardized terms, or even that it relied on one submitted by the ATA.
Presumably what the DOJ meant was that the agreed-upon terms
did not include price, payment terms, limitations on remedies, or
other key terms of the contract.151 The European Commission has
suggested a similar approach.152 As the difference in opinion
the ATA versions leave the issue of broker indemnification to the negotiations of the parties).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
148. Barnett Letter, supra note 141, at 2.
149. If only a small number of firms deviated from what was otherwise a widely used term,
there might be some reason for standardization, because counterparties might assume that
all firms used the more common term, and it might be difficult to determine the true terms.
150. In other respects, too, the Barnett letter does not seem to capture the potential issues
posed by the ATA agreement. For example, the letter states that it is issued on the
understanding that the term regarding dispute resolution “would be left blank for each carrier
to negotiate individually with brokers.” Barnett Letter, supra note 141, at 2. In the published
agreement, this is true only in a strained sense. The ATA Model Contract states “the terms
and procedures set forth in Attachment 3 hereto shall be controlling if a dispute arises with
regard to its application or interpretation.” ATA Model Motor Carrier/Broker Agreement,
supra note 73, § 10. This leaves the parties free to negotiate their own “Attachment 3,” but
the agreement as it appears on the ATA website includes an Attachment 3 that outlines
detailed provisions for dispute resolution, including “final and binding arbitration under the
Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association.” Id. at Attachment 3, para. 2.
151. See Barnett Letter, supra note 141, at 2 (“The model agreements do not contain any
provisions specifying rates to be charged or other competitively significant terms.”).
152. See Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC
Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2001 O.J. (C 3) § 6, para. 164, available at

2010]

STANDARDIZATION OF STANDARD-FORM CONTRACTS

367

between the ATA and the TIA shows, though, it may be difficult for
an outsider to the transaction to determine what is competitively
significant.153 As Hugh Collins has written, “[c]ourts do not have
access to reliable information about the operation of particular
markets in practice, so that in concentrating on the balance of the
formal terms they may not understand the idiosyncratic conditions
under which the market sector has to operate.”154
Moreover, if there are many agreed-upon terms, as in the ATA’s
proposed contract and in many other standardized contracts, the
cumulative harm in allowing one side to the contract to choose could
be significant even if individual terms are not important.155 If it is
true that any harm that would otherwise be caused by allowing one
party to define many minor terms would be prevented by an
adjustment to the price, there might not be a problem.156 But if the
DOJ’s point is that the parties do not focus on these terms, then
there is little to suggest that the standardization would result in a
renegotiation of the price of the contract. Perhaps the standardization itself would make it cost-effective for the parties to focus on
these terms, but it is far from clear whether that is so, or whether
the DOJ focused on that issue.
To be sure, price could compensate for unfair or undesirable
terms even if consumers were not focused on those terms. So long as
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2001:003:0002:0030:EN:PDF
(“No appreciable restriction is found ... in agreements ... that standardize aspects such as
minor product characteristics, forms, and reports, which have an insignificant effect on the
main factors affecting competition in the relevant markets.”). Like the DOJ, the EC does not
offer any substantive justification for this position.
153. Although the effects of contract standardization would seem easy for lawyers to
assess, because contracts are legal documents, an understanding of those effects may in fact
require a fairly detailed understanding of the business context in which those contracts will
be used. In fact, a trucking lawyer who has followed the history of the ATA and TIA
agreements has said that the DOJ probably knew nothing of that history. Interview with
Henry E. Seaton, Seaton & Husk, LP, in Vienna, Va. (Jan. 2008).
154. Collins, supra note 11, at 793.
155. This is especially so if the perceived insignificance of the terms is due in part to the
infrequency with which they will occur. In that case, when there are many such terms, the
likelihood of at least one term becoming relevant may be significant. Moreover, it is likely to
be very difficult for the parties to evaluate the significance of these sorts of low-probability
events, and the parties may have different views about the likelihood of their occurrence.
156. In the context of vertical restraints, and more particularly vertical price restraints,
the usual justification for allowing manufacturers to impose minimum prices on their dealers
assumes that such prices will force the dealers to provide more in the way of services.
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there is vigorous price competition, sellers may be forced to charge
a competitive price that reflects the other terms of the contract.157
Moreover, this sort of price competition will increase when contracts
are standardized. With unstandardized contracts, price might not
respond fully to the inclusion of an unfair term. But this sort of
competition requires that the market be a competitive one, and
more particularly that it be one in which price competition is
vigorous.
Just as importantly, perhaps, it requires uniformity among
buyers. Although it is possible that sellers could divide themselves
into several groups, each of which would serve a different group of
buyers, that situation seems unlikely. If standardization results in
uniformity on nonprice terms, it is likely that competition will drive
sellers to uniform prices as well. In that case, some consumers will
be disadvantaged by the agreement on nonprice terms, and others
will be advantaged. This scenario is a fundamental problem with
standardization, and it is a problem that price competition cannot
solve.
It may be useful here to turn to contract law. Some courts
have indicated that the standardization, or even uniformity, of
contract terms across an industry will contribute to a finding of
procedural unconscionability.158 Courts take this approach because
157. This is a critical, though unstated, aspect of Hugh Collins’s description:
At first sight, such a regulatory strategy appears to pose a potential threat to
competition in the market. It would require or induce all businesses in a
particular trade sector to use the same standard form contract, thereby
removing the possibility of competition between contract terms. But it seems
unlikely in fact that there would be any significant anticompetitive effects
caused by the use of standardised terms. The model standard form would not
determine the price and the nature of the main subject matter of the contract,
but would merely supply all the other standard terms of the transaction. For
these ancillary terms, there is unlikely to be a competitive market, since
consumers and small businesses normally concentrate their attention on the
principal features of the transaction rather than the small print of the standard
form contract.
Collins, supra note 11, at 800. In order that standardization of minor terms not have
anticompetitive effects, it is not sufficient that, as Collins says, consumers are inattentive to
them. See id. It must also be that there is sufficient competition on other terms, and that the
competition on those other terms responds to the standardization.
158. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding a conclusion
of procedural unconscionability and noting that when customers complained about the
arbitration clause at issue, “AT&T responded with a letter informing them that ‘all other
major long distance carriers have included an arbitration provision in their services
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an element—in California, a sufficient element—in a determination
of procedural unconscionability is that the contract at issue is one
of adhesion, that is, a contract that a party can only accept or reject,
but not negotiate.159 Some contend that the availability of alternatives in the market will affect the adhesion analysis,160 but if a
contract is standardized across the industry, there will be no such
alternatives.
Most states require both procedural and substantive unconscionability, however, and if the standardized terms are minor ones,
perhaps substantive unconscionability would not be found. On the
other hand, it is possible that even some minor terms might be
viewed as sufficient to justify a finding of unconscionability—such
a finding could be especially likely if the agreement on terms was
viewed as establishing a high level of procedural unconscionability,
because in many states less substantive unconscionability is needed
if the level of procedural unconscionability is great.161
Here, reference to the European approach to unfair contract
terms is helpful. The Council of the European Union’s Unfair
Contract Terms Directive seeks to establish community-wide
elimination of unfair terms in business-to-consumer contracts.162 It
states that “[a] contractual term which has not been individually
negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’
rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment
of the consumer.”163 More relevant to present purposes, it sets out
a nonexclusive list of terms that “may be regarded as unfair.”164 One
could take the position that agreement by sellers on any of these
agreement’”).
159. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689 (Cal. 2000)
(reviewing principles of unconscionability).
160. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah:
Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381, 1411 (1996) (“[A] free
market ceases to exist ... unless the customer or the employee has some meaningful
alternatives.”).
161. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690 (“Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards
the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in
proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms
themselves.” (quoting 15 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1763A (3d ed. 1972))).
162. Council Directive 93/13, supra note 16, art. 1, § 1.
163. Id. art. 3, § 1.
164. Id. art. 3, § 3; see also id. annex (listing potentially unfair contract terms).
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terms would constitute both unconscionability (with the procedural
element being provided by the agreement) and an antitrust
violation, or perhaps a sufficient antitrust concern to require the
sellers to demonstrate procompetitive effects, as in the “quick look”
rule of reason.165
But the few contract decisions that consider standardization
express little concern. The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Harbor Court
Associates v. Leo A. Daly Co., for example, considered a provision in
the standard American Institute of Architects (AIA) construction
contract that altered the default rule for the statute of limitations.166
Under the usual rule in the two states at issue, the limitations
period began to run at the time of discovery of the wrong, but
under the AIA contract, the limitations period began to run at the
time construction was complete.167 Although one cannot be sure
whether the DOJ would have considered this a “competitively
significant” term, it seems unlikely, given the lack of scrutiny it
applied to the ATA contract.168
In any event, the Fourth Circuit relied on freedom-of-contract
principles to enforce the contractual alteration.169 Indeed, the court
made the point that price competition could serve to redress any
imbalance produced by the provision:
For even if such a contractual limitation redounds only to [the
architect’s] benefit—in the form of an increase in repose and a
decrease in liability—[the developer] was free in return to
reduce the compensation it was willing to offer for [the architect’s] services, or indeed to hire another architect for the
project.170

Given that the contract was the AIA’s standard one, it is not clear,
of course, that another architect would have used another provision.
165. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining “quick
look” rule of reason analysis).
166. 179 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1999).
167. Id. at 149.
168. See supra note 150.
169. See, e.g., Harbor Court Assocs., 179 F.3d at 153 (“[I]t is not the province of courts to
emasculate the liberty of contract by enabling parties to escape their contractual obligations
on the pretext of public policy.” (quoting S. Neb. Rural Pub. Power v. Neb. Elec. Generation
& Transmission Coop, Inc., 546 N.W. 2d 315, 319 (Neb. 1996))).
170. Id. at 151.
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There is also no indication that the parties engaged in any negotiations regarding this provision. But they presumably could have, and
the court noted that there had been no allegation “that this contract
was induced by fraud or duress, or that the bargaining power of the
parties was anything but equal.”171 The court did, however, note that
“the parties to the agreement are sophisticated business actors who
sought, by contract, to allocate business risks in advance,” suggesting perhaps that the result might have been different in other
circumstances.172
The DOJ letter and Harbor Court opinion support the view that
neither under antitrust nor under contract law would standardization of minor terms receive searching scrutiny. Interestingly,
though, the reasons given seem to some extent contradictory. In the
business review letter, the DOJ relied on the fact that the terms at
issue were not “competitively significant.”173 But in the similar context of the AIA contract in Harbor Court, the court relied on the
disadvantaged party’s ability to negotiate compensation for the
restriction,174 which seems to imply competitive significance. Of
course, it is possible that the limitation date, in contrast to the
terms at issue in the DOJ letter, is significant. But that is hardly
clear, and it is not even clear how such a determination should be
made.
3. Quality: Agreement on Fair Terms
Quality or regulatory standards pose a different problem. Here
the goal of the sellers is to enter into an agreement that is “better”
in some sense. Such an agreement should either benefit all buyers
or provide enough benefits to some buyers to outweigh harms to
others. It might also benefit sellers, or at least some sellers, by
eliminating or lessening competition from those that would
otherwise use less desirable alternatives. So, for example, in the
product context, sellers of children’s toys might agree not to use lead
paint, which, assuming all buyers would prefer toys without lead
paint, would benefit both buyers and those sellers who would not
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
Harbor Court Assocs., 179 F.3d at 151.
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use it in any case. In the contract context, sellers might agree, for
example, not to disclaim warranties or not to require arbitration.
Even agreements that claim to be quality standards, however,
may violate antitrust law. In National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States, the Court considered a provision of the
society’s code of ethics that effectively prohibited competitive
bidding,175 a prohibition that the society justified by arguing that
competitive bidding would produce inferior engineering work.176 The
Court condemned the agreement, which it viewed as a “frontal
assault” on competition.177 Of course, the Court might reasonably
have had some doubt as to the society’s disinterestedness regarding the benefits of the agreement. In a case in which the
claimed benefits were not so obviously likely to raise prices, a
regulatory restraint might be permissible.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to find examples of clearly beneficial regulatory standardization, either of products or of contracts.
In many cases, sellers offering beneficial terms to buyers would no
doubt prefer to offer them unilaterally and advertise them to seek
an advantage over their competitors. Perhaps only when the terms
are minor and not likely to provide a competitive advantage would
standardization be an appropriate strategy. In that case, a seller
might want to adopt the favorable term, perhaps because it believes
it will provide long-term competitive benefits, but might prefer not
to put itself at a short-term disadvantage vis-à-vis its competitors.
Of course, this is exactly the sort of elimination of competition with
which Professional Engineers was concerned,178 so the question is
whether sellers could justify this sort of agreement.
Here we might again return to a focus on specific terms that have
been determined to be unfair. At least in the consumer context, it
seems that an agreement to eliminate such terms could be procompetitive. Such an agreement seems different from the one in
Professional Engineers for two reasons. First, competitive bidding
175. See 435 U.S. 679, 682-83 (1978). The provision did not affect contracts formed between
engineers and their clients, except in that it forbade submission of a fee proposal before a
client had chosen an engineer and begun negotiations on a contract. Id.
176. Id. at 693-94.
177. Id. at 695.
178. Id. at 691-93 (noting that the ban on competitive bidding in the Society’s agreement
“restrain[ed] trade within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act”).
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is not unfair, or at least the society in Professional Engineers could
not rely on any previous determination to that effect.179 Second, in
the business-to-business context of Professional Engineers, the
parties to the agreement are presumably able to defend themselves
from unfair terms. It is in the consumer context that unfair terms
might escape the attention of consumers, which creates a market
failure that agreement on a standard contract could remedy.
So there might be some specific terms—perhaps those that have
been found unconscionable—whose elimination would be both
contractually fair and procompetitive. Of course, there is probably
no consensus among the states on what terms are unconscionable.
Still, it seems that an agreement to eliminate any term that has
been held unconscionable in any jurisdiction would be a reasonable
one, at least from a contract point of view. Most contract standardization does not, however, take the form of prohibition of undesired
provisions. Instead, standardization usually consists of the adoption
of particular terms.180 Perhaps the adoption of a particular term
when there is an alternative that has been determined to be
unconscionable should be viewed as a quality standard, but this
approach seems to attribute quality goals where none may exist.
In Europe, there has been consideration of a more systematic
approach. Standardization has been seen as a means to harmonize
European contract law. The focus is largely on uniformity, with the
goal of integrating the European economy, but there is also concern
about contract quality, as the European Commission has described:
As a first step in promoting the development of EU-wide
standard terms and conditions, it is important to establish a list
of existing initiatives both at a European level and within the
Member States. Once such a list is made available, parties
interested in developing standard terms and conditions could
obtain information on similar initiatives in other sectors or in
the same sectors in other Member States. Thus they could learn

179. Id. at 692-93 (stating that “the ban [on competitive bidding] ‘impedes the ordinary give
and take of the market place’ and substantially deprives the customer of ‘the ability to utilize
and compare prices in selecting engineering services’” (quoting United States v. Nat’l Soc’y
Prof’‘l Eng’rs, 404 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C. 1976))).
180. Sometimes, standard contracts offer alternative terms, but more often the standard
provides only one option. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 75-76.

374

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:327

from the mistakes of others and benefit from their successes
(“best practices”).181

It is not entirely clear whether the “best practices” referred to
here are intended to promote uniformity or contract quality in the
sense of fairness, but in the same communication the Commission
made reference to quality issues. Specifically, it stated that it
“intend[ed] to publish guidelines, the purpose of which [would be] to
remind interested companies, persons and organisations that
certain legal and other limits apply,”182 and it referred specifically
to the Unfair Contract Terms Directive and to the involvement in
the process of “representatives from all relevant groups.”183 The
European Commission has also been engaged in an ongoing effort
to reform European contract law, and much of that effort has been
focused on ensuring contractual fairness.184
Despite the potential benefits of this sort of legal self-regulation,
though, it may create conflicts with statutes or common law.
Generally speaking, similar issues do not arise with uniformity or
quality standards because there are few mandatory business terms.
Even in the contract area, most legal rules are only default rules,
not mandatory ones. But there are some legal rules that parties
are not permitted to alter, or are permitted to alter only in certain
ways, and attempts to self-regulate with respect to these rules are
problematic.185 Even where rules are only defaults, differences from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction may suggest that standardization is
undesirable.
181. Commission of the European Communities, Communication, A More Coherent
European Contract Law: An Action Plan, at 22 para. 86, COM (2003) 68 final (Dec. 2, 2003),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0068:FIN:
EN:PDF [hereinafter Action Plan].
182. Id. at 22 para. 88. The Commission later stated that it no longer planned to publish
such guidelines. European Contract Law, supra note 15, at 7 (“The Commission does not
intend at this stage to publish separate guidelines relating to the development and use of
[standard terms and conditions].”).
183. Action Plan, supra note 181, at 22-23 para. 88.
184. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, Second Progress Report on the
Common Frame of Reference, COM (2007) 447 final (July 25, 2007), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0447:FIN:EN:PDF (stating that
principles of “fair dealing” provide the essential background for formulating new EU contractlaw provisions).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
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An example of these sorts of difficulties can be found in the 1989
(and still current) revision of the Joint Operating Agreement (JOA)
for oil and gas exploration promulgated by the American Association
of Professional Landmen (AAPL).186 In a controversial amendment
in the 1989 JOA, the AAPL sought to define the legal relationship
among joint venturers, eliminating duties they might otherwise
have:
It is not the intention of the parties to create, nor shall this
agreement be construed as creating a mining or other partnership, joint venture, agency relationship or association, or to
render the parties liable as partners, co-venturers, or principals.
In their relations with each other under this agreement, the
parties shall not be considered fiduciaries or to have established
a confidential relationship but rather shall be free to act on an
arms-length basis in accordance with their own respective selfinterest, subject, however, to the obligation of the parties to act
in good faith in their dealings with each other with respect to
activities hereunder.187

The problem with this provision is that the law generally makes
its own determination of partnership status and the existence vel
non of fiduciary duties.188 In a review of this issue, John Burritt

186. See Am. Ass’n of Prof’l Landmen, About AAPL, http://www.landman.org/WCM/AAPL/
ABOUT_AAPL/AAPL/About_AAPL/About_AAPL.aspx?hkey=04c0535f-d6bd-4e38-a29f39f11a4764c8 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (“Landmen constitute the business side of the oil and
gas and mineral exploration and production team.”).
187. Onecle, Sample Business Contracts, http://contracts.onecle.com/ivanhoe/discovery.jv.
2001.03.05.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (providing the full text of the JOA). This
provision is discussed in John Burritt McArthur, Judging Made Too Easy: The Judicial
Exaggeration of Exculpatory and Liability-Limiting Clauses in the Oilfield’s Operator
Fiduciary Cases, 56 SMU L. REV. 925, 954-59 (2003).
188. Cf. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Charles B. Wilson, Jr., Inc., 976 P.2d 941, 955 (Kan. 1999)
(refusing to enforce JOA’s exculpatory provision because “parties in a joint venture stand in
a close relationship of trust and confidence”). Professor David Pierce described the Amoco
Production case as applying a “basic syllogism”: “a joint operating agreement creates a joint
venture, a joint venture creates fiduciary duties, therefore a joint operating agreement creates
fiduciary duties.” Richard James, Comment, Kansas Oil and Gas Law: Defining the Duty
Between Participants in a Joint Operating Agreement, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 128, 138 (1999)
(quoting David E. Pierce, Kansas Supreme Court Applies Joint Venture Analysis to Operating
Agreement, OIL-GAS & MINERAL LAW SECTION (Kan. Bar Ass’n, Topeka, Kan.), June 1999, at
4).
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McArthur notes that the enforceability of these provisions is not
clear:
[A]nother review that covers all major oilfield jurisdictions
concludes that exculpatory clauses, at least under certain
conditions including that the exculpation be clearly expressed,
are likely to be enforced in four states that lack anti-indemnity
statutes (Colorado, Montana, Oklahoma, and Utah) and two
states that exclude operating agreements from such statutes
(Texas and Louisiana), but that New Mexico and Wyoming, two
other major oilfield jurisdictions, would not enforce them.189

McArthur also discusses the antitrust implications of this provision of the JOA, though he notes that “[a]ntitrust litigation has
been conspicuously absent from the exploration and production
sector of the industry.”190 He argues that the JOA is the product of
the larger oil companies.191 Perhaps the exculpatory clause would
create an advantage for those companies.192 McArthur argues that
despite the efficiency benefits of a standard agreement, “[t]he oil
and gas industry thrived in decades of vigorous exploration without
giving operators an absolute shield against fiduciary liability” and
“[i]t is hardly plausible that the recently expanded protection is
needed to bring the JOA into existence or to secure its benefits.”193
Although there are obstacles to antitrust liability in this case,194
a contract with standardized terms that are unenforceable is problematic, even if the terms are unenforceable only in some jurisdictions. Such terms could appropriately be labeled anticompetitive,
especially given that all parties might not know about the unenforceability of the terms, which would distort competition among the
189. McArthur, supra note 187, at 966-67 (citing Robert C. Bledsoe, The Operating
Agreement: Matters Not Covered or Inadequately Covered, 47 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 15-1,
15-4 to -18 (2001)); see also Amoco Prod. Co., 976 P.2d at 954 (refusing to enforce JOA’s
exculpatory provision).
190. McArthur, supra note 187, at 967. He also notes that “[o]ne sign of the absence of
antitrust litigation is the lack of significant law-review writing on oil and gas antitrust
issues.” Id. at 967 n.146.
191. Id. at 966 n.142.
192. Cf. supra text accompanying note 72 (making analogous point about TIA agreement).
193. McArthur, supra note 187, at 971.
194. McArthur points out the difficulty of establishing an agreement on the JOA. Id. at
969-70.
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parties. Even if all parties did know about the invalidity of the
terms, it seems that competition is distorted when it takes place
with only partly enforceable contracts.
Even in the absence of an antitrust violation, the contract
could be unconscionable. As suggested above, the contract standardization could be sufficient to constitute procedural unconscionability,195 and the unenforceable terms could satisfy the requirement
of substantive unconscionability. On the other hand, one could take
the position that an unenforceable term, because it is unenforceable,
will not impose any contractual burden, and therefore should not be
viewed as unconscionable. But this position assumes that the
disadvantaged party knows enough to ignore, or seek a declaration
of unenforceability of, the invalid term. If some do not, it seems that
agreeing to put such a term in the contract is unconscionable.
Furthermore, as suggested above, it is questionable whether an
agreement should standardize legal responsibilities when different
jurisdictions have different rules regarding those responsibilities.
Just as different parties may have different views regarding certain
contractual issues, one can view different legal rules in different
jurisdictions as taking different views on those issues. At the very
least, then, one would expect a standardized contract to offer
explicitly the alternative options for rules such as these.196 To
standardize a particular position seems to preempt not only competition among contracting parties, but also competition among
legal jurisdictions.
B. Process: Transaction Costs and Bargaining
Competition law and contract law have different views of the
bargaining process. Competition law serves to ensure, at least
generally, that bargaining is one-to-one. Although collective
bargaining is permissible in some circumstances, such bargaining
generally involves an agreement among competitors, so antitrust
law requires that it be procompetitive.197 But beyond this scrutiny
195. See supra text accompanying note 158.
196. Cf. supra text accompanying note 76 (making an analogous assertion about the ATA
agreement).
197. In the labor context, however, where much collective bargaining takes place, there is
a specific antitrust exemption. See generally Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
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of agreements, antitrust law does not focus particularly on the
quality of bargaining. Contract law, on the other hand, is more
substantive, emphasizing consent with doctrines that focus on
duress and, in the procedural component of unconscionability,
relative bargaining power and knowledge.
The importance of process to antitrust law is apparent in cases
considering standards, because in such cases the courts have
usually used a procedural test rather than a substantive one. In
the United States, the Supreme Court set out the basic standard
in Allied Tube: “When ... private associations promulgate safety
standards based on the merits of objective expert judgments and
through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from
being biased by members with economic interests in stifling product competition ... those private standards can have significant
procompetitive advantages.”198 Despite that direction, however,
there has been little emphasis on exactly what procedures are
necessary, or which would be sufficient.
The European Commission’s approach to standardization appears
to have elements similar to those relied upon by Allied Tube. In
Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf (SCK), the Commission
and subsequently the Court of First Instance considered actions by
a certification body (SCK) for mobile-crane operators.199 One element for determining whether the certification system restricted
competition, the Commission said, was whether it was “completely
open, independent and transparent.”200 This presumably imposes
requirements similar to Allied Tube’s requirement that a standardsetting system be “based on the merits of objective expert judgments
and through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process
from being biased.”201
It is not clear that this is the proper approach for a case involving
standard-form contracts. The focus of the analysis is on whether fair
and objective procedures have been applied, an approach that the
Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975) (discussing organized labor’s exemption
from federal antitrust law).
198. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988).
199. Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf v.
Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R. II-1739.
200. Id. para. 125.
201. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 501.
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courts perhaps adopt for product standards because they lack
technical expertise in most areas of standardization.202 But courts
presumably understand contracts. Consequently, a closer, more
substantive scrutiny might be appropriate for contractual standardization.203 Whether this would take the form of a contract-law-like
focus on fairness or would be based on some other criterion is not
entirely clear.
Little attention has been paid by the courts, however, to specific
criteria for reviewing the standard-setting process, with the
statements from the cases discussed above constituting the key
points. And even less attention has been paid to this issue in the few
contract-standardization cases. Although the importance of involvement from both sides of the contract is sometimes mentioned,
specific criteria or implications are not. Moreover, in cases where
there have been shortcomings in the bargaining process, those
shortcomings have not generally resulted in comment, let alone
condemnation of the standardized contract.
Some specific criteria can be derived from statute. The process
issues are addressed, if only briefly, in U.S. antitrust provisions set
out in the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act
of 2004.204 This Act requires application of the rule of reason, rather
than the per se rule, to “standards development activity”205 and
limits antitrust liability to single damages.206 But these provisions
apply only to “voluntary consensus standards,” which are “standards developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards
bodies”:207
202. See Heike Schweitzer, European Standard-Setting Policy and the Role of Competition
Law, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW: 15TH
ST. GALLEN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW FORUM ICF 2008, at 42 (Carl Baudenbacher
ed., 2009) (“In principle, this assessment [of the competitive effect of a standard] would need
to be based on an inquiry into the merits of the relevant standard—an analysis which
competition authorities or courts are not well placed to perform.”).
203. On the other hand, it is possible that the effects of contractual standardization require
a greater understanding of the market at issue than does the standardization of other
products. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
204. 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (2006).
205. Id. § 4302.
206. Id. § 4303(a).
207. Id. § 4301(a)(8) (citing OMB Circular No. A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546, 8554 (Feb. 19,
1998)) (“The term ‘standards development organization’ means a domestic or international
organization that plans, develops, establishes, or coordinates voluntary consensus standards
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A voluntary consensus standards body is defined by the following attributes:
(i) Openness.
(ii) Balance of interest.
(iii) Due process.
(iv) An appeals process.
(v) Consensus, which is defined as general agreement,
but not necessarily unanimity, and includes a process
for attempting to resolve objections by interested
parties, as long as all comments have been fairly
considered, each objector is advised of the disposition
of his or her objection(s) and the reasons why, and the
consensus body members are given an opportunity to
change their votes after reviewing the comments.208

Although this definition does not condemn standard-setting
processes that fail to meet the criteria set out, it does provide some
concrete tests. Moreover, putting aside the due process and appeals
requirements, the openness and balance criteria could be viewed as
reflecting similar concerns in contract law. In unconscionability
analysis, both the availability of information and bargaining power
play roles, and those factors seem similar to the openness and
balance-of-interest criteria. Furthermore, openness and balance
appear to be formal and substantive sides of the same coin, with
openness requiring access to the standard-formation process and
balance requiring an ability to influence the outcome of that process.
The openness and balance of contract standardization are likely
to be affected by the organizational model through which the standardization takes place. Approaching the issue from the contract-law
side, Joseph Perillo has recently argued that particular bargaining
contexts can produce “neutral” standard-form contracts.209 He discusses several such contexts. One is what he calls the “collaborative”
model, in which “[t]he drafting of boilerplate terms by ... a diverse
group helps ensure that the concerns of most stakeholders will be

using procedures that incorporate the attributes of openness, balance of interests, due process,
an appeals process, and consensus in a manner consistent with the Office of Management and
Budget Circular Number A-119, as revised February 19, 1998.”).
208. OMB Circular No. A-119, 63 Fed. Reg. at 8554.
209. Perillo, supra note 10, at 179.
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taken into account.”210 Another he calls the “collective bargain,”
where “[s]tandard forms are ... negotiated between potentially
adversary organizations.”211 To these multilateral—or multilateral
and bilateral—models, one can add the unilateral model, in which
a contract is standardized by a group of firms on one side of the
contract.212
Contract standardization can also differ along another organizational axis. Many standard contracts are created by a preexisting
organization that also provides other services to its members. Other
instances of standardization, however, appear to be effected by ad
hoc groups that had no further role. The efforts of such groups, in
fact, appear to have been among the more problematic of standardization efforts.213 That may not be surprising, because ad hoc groups
probably have less to lose from an antitrust violation and are
perhaps less focused on legal advice and constraints. In any event,
this leaves us with this table of organizational alternatives:214
Organizational Alternatives

Ad hoc
agreement
Pre-existing
organization

Unilateral
(single
stakeholder)

Bilateral (two
stakeholders/
“adversarial”)

Catalano;
Hartford Fire
Insurance
Professional
Engineers;
ATA and TIA
contracts;
AAPL JOA;
AIA, ISO?

no examples
found in cases
failed ATA-TIA
effort

Multilateral
(multiple
stakeholders/
“collaborative”)
no examples
found in cases;
unlikely?
ISDA;
AIA, ISO?

210. Id. at 184.
211. Id. at 186.
212. Id. at 182.
213. Several Supreme Court cases—Paramount Famous Lasky, Catalano, and Hartford
Fire Insurance—did involve what appear to be ad hoc groups that created form contracts. See
supra notes 94-102, 116-21 and accompanying text.
214. A similar typology is presented in Cafaggi, supra note 11, at 107 tbl.6.1, 116 tbl.6.3.

382

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:327

As the table shows, several of the standardization examples
discussed earlier can be classified by these organizational alternatives, as can the International Swaps and Derivatives Association,
Inc. (ISDA), which is discussed immediately below.215 The category
in which the AIA and ISO efforts belong is not clear. On the one
hand, they claim to welcome input from various stakeholders. On
the other hand, the extent to which they are truly “open” and exhibit
a “balance of interests” in their processes is not clear, as is discussed
in the following paragraphs.
1. Open Access to the Standardization Process
Many standard-setting organizations do provide at least formal
access to their standard-setting processes. The organizations might
exercise ultimate control over the results, but input is possible from
interested parties. The DOJ has indicated the importance of this
openness in a business review letter addressing standardization
(though not contract standardization):
You have assured us that the processes under which the
reliability standards are to be established and enforced are open
to all interested parties, provide for representation for all
segments of the industry, are not designed to competitively
disadvantage any particular party or segment of the industry,
and that Commission or court review will be available to review
disputes.216

Multilateral standardization efforts seem designed to provide this
sort of openness. The AIA, for example, describes its drafting process as multilateral:
The process is based on the cooperative input of a Documents
Committee of practicing architects who have been appointed
based on their experience, regional diversity, and variety of
practices. Beyond the input of these committee members, the
215. See infra text accompanying notes 221-23.
216. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to Joseph C. Bell, Esq. & Mary Ann Mason, Esq., Hogan & Hartson, LLP (June 17, 1999),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/214456.htm [hereinafter Klein
Letter].
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AIA also solicits feedback from owners, general contractors,
engineers, subcontractors, sureties, lawyers, insurers, and
others. By considering the opinions of a broad range of disciplines, the AIA strives to publish documents that account for the
best interests of all parties affected by them.217

It is not clear, however, to what extent the aspiration of multilateralism is met. Professor Sweet has provided a description of the
AIA drafting process gained in part from his experience observing
that process. He observes that the AIA solicits the views of the
Associated General Contractors (AGC), the primary organization for
builders, and even receives the AGC’s endorsement for some of its
documents.218 But he says that “the AIA document creation process
is notable for the conspicuous absence of owners or groups with the
owner’s interests in mind.”219 Sweet points out that there are also
issues with the ultimate control over the process;220 these issues are
taken up below.
This suggests that there may be problems even with a multilateral, “collaborative” process. The primary example that Perillo offers
for the success of his “collaborative” model is the ISDA,221 which has
a very broad range of participants:
ISDA ... has over 830 member institutions from 57 countries on
six continents. These members include most of the world's major
institutions that deal in privately negotiated derivatives, as well
as many of the businesses, governmental entities and other end
users that rely on over-the-counter derivatives to manage
efficiently the financial market risks inherent in their core
economic activities.222

217. Am. Inst. of Architects, History of AIA Contract Documents, http://www.aia.org/
contractdocs/AIAS076671?dvid=&recspec=AIAS076671 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
218. See Sweet, supra note 77, at 319-22. The AIA does not seek the endorsement of any
other organization for its documents dealing with architectural services. See id. at 322.
219. Id. at 322.
220. Id.
221. Perillo, supra note 10, at 184 (“[The ISDA’s Master Agreement] helps ensure that the
concerns of most stakeholders will be taken into account. The model by which it is created is
a participatory, collaborative effort by its stakeholders rather than an adversarial clash.”).
222. Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, About ISDA, http://isda.org (follow “About ISDA”
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
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But a key difference between the ISDA and many other contractstandardization organizations is the nature of the contracts at issue.
As with some other standardized contracts, the swap and derivative
agreements are in a sense symmetric, in that particular parties
could find themselves on either side of one of the contracts.223 As a
result, there is an inherent incentive for each party to make the
contract a balanced one. In that respect, the parties are acting from
what is inherently a bilateral perspective.
An “openness” problem could still be present even in a “symmetric” context like that of the ISDA, though. For example, suppose
that the contract at issue was one that established terms for
intermediaries like brokers or agents. Suppose also that such a
contract established expensive and inefficient dispute-resolution
procedures, but left the brokers free to establish individually the
fees for their services. If all brokers, or a large proportion of them,
used this standard contract, they would presumably incorporate the
excess costs of the dispute-resolution procedure into their fees.
Widespread use of the contract would likely make such passing-on
possible, because the users of the brokers’ services would have
nowhere else to turn.
In this scenario, the contract standardization can be viewed as
anticompetitive in the sense that it raises prices to users.224 The
contracting parties would not, however, necessarily reap greater
profits, because they would also incur greater costs as a result of the
inefficient terms of the contract. The contract standardization would
be a means of creating anticompetitive waste, not anticompetitive
profits.225
223. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for
Mortgage Rules Consonant with Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and
Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1180-81 (1984) (noting that certain “preformulated”
contracts “reflect the needs of the marketplace and consumer protection”); Samuel Krislov &
Paul Kramer, 20/20 Vision: The Future of the California Civil Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1915,
1957 (1993) (describing the formation of standard contracts, which are developed with equal
bargaining power allocated between the parties).
224. But see Sean M. Flanagan, Student Article, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group
Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 211, 232 (2001) (explaining how the ISDA Master Agreement has certain measures that
reduce transaction costs, including “close-out activity” which yields lower “transaction costs,
lower legal fees, less legal risk, and reduced default risk”).
225. However, in the example given, there could be profits gained through the dispute
resolution process, as perhaps by an inefficient arbitration organization.
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Ultimately, then, the participation in bargaining by parties on
both sides of the contract would not suffice to prevent anticompetitive contracting. Participation by those who ultimately bear the
costs of the terms at issue would also be necessary, because only
they would have the incentive to ensure that the contracting terms
are efficient. Moreover, participation would need to be informed,
and that is a condition that might not easily be met. It seems
possible that principals working through brokers would not have
good information about the costs and benefits of contractual choices
made by the brokers. Without such information, the principals could
not effectively influence the standardization process.
On the other hand, contract law generally requires consent only
of parties to a contract, not of third parties affected by it.226 That
is, although contract law requires consent, not just involvement in
the process, it requires only bilateral, not multilateral, consent.227
Therefore, contract law would not seem to call for more than
bilateral bargaining, at least for two-party contracts. In one sense,
then, contract law requires more, and in another, antitrust law
requires more. Antitrust law’s concern for the overall competitive
effect of a standard is broader than contract law’s focus on the
agreement itself, so antitrust law sees benefits in broader participation, but contract law has a more stringent consent requirement.
2. Balance in the Standardization Process
As suggested above, even contract negotiation processes that
are open to all interested parties may be subject to the control of
one party. For example, returning to the AIA, both scholars228 and
industry participants229 suggest that the AIA’s documents favor
architects and to a lesser extent contractors at the expense of
owners. This illustrates the difficulty of incorporating meaningful
input from other industry players when the process is controlled by
an organization like the AIA, whose members are on one side of the
contract to be standardized. Professor Sweet is skeptical:

226.
227.
228.
229.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. g (1981).
See id. §§ 1-2.
Sweet, supra note 77, at 319-22.
Id. at 336-37.
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The more difficult question will be whether the AIA will really
share its power. Although perhaps willing to seek the input of
more owner-oriented groups regarding AIA drafts, the AIA
would strenuously resist giving up any real power. This resistance is reflected in the recent Futures Task Force Report
concerning AIA Policy on Documents Preparation and Review
where the AIA notes that participation must be “responsible.”
More importantly, the report notes that the AIA must exercise
control to insure full and fair consideration of all interests,
document-making must be expeditious and orderly and AIA
policy or the public interest must not be compromised. In short,
the AIA must have “full and final authority.”230

These concerns have been borne out in public forums. In the 1960s,
for example, contractors objected to an indemnity clause in an
AIA contract, and the contractor groups persuaded state legislatures
to limit those clauses.231 The National Association of Attorneys
General has also had concerns about AIA contracts, and at one time
it even considered publishing its own model contracts.232
It seems likely that similar problems would exist for many
formally multilateral processes. To make the process manageable,
it may be necessary to have it controlled by one industry group. In
some respects, it seems that the straightforward bilateral bargain
would be more promising. It seems likely that in the bilateral
context it both would be both easier to determine whether the
parties agree and easier to manage the process while still accepting
input by both parties. Perillo’s “collective bargain” contemplates
“negotiat[ion] between potentially adversary organizations.”233
Collective bargaining agreements in the organized-labor context
also often involve associations of employers, but in that context the
antitrust issues are subject to a specific antitrust exemption.234
An example of a bilateral relationship in the contract-standardization context was initially present in the ATA-TIA carrier-broker
230. Id. at 341-42 (footnotes omitted).
231. Id. at 339.
232. Id. at 342.
233. Perillo, supra note 10, at 186.
234. Collective bargaining agreements are both statutorily and judicially exempt from
antitrust regulations. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) (statutory); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518
U.S. 231, 235 (1995) (judicial).
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agreement discussed above,235 but that bilateral arrangement
broke down. The two organizations, the ATA and the TIA, sought to
negotiate a joint agreement, but they could not agree on terms, so
each created its own agreement.236 It seems clear that a breakdown
in bargaining like this is evidence that there could be a problem
with a standardized contract adopted by one side, at least if the
contract takes a position on the subject that caused the breakdown.
As previously discussed, that was indeed the case in the carrierbroker negotiation.237
Another arguably bilateral negotiation on a standardized contract was that in Hartford Fire Insurance.238 The defendants in that
case, the group of insurers, sought to persuade the ISO to change a
standardized contract, and when the ISO declined to do so, the
insurers organized a boycott.239 The relationship here was bilateral
in the sense that there were two different preferences regarding
the contract at issue, but in fact the parties involved were really
all insurers, and thus were on one side of the contract.240 Even
then, their interests diverged enough to prevent agreement on the
contract.
It is telling that in these bilateral contexts, the negotiations broke
down. In fact, the cases do not present any example of successful
bilateral contract standardization. That at least raises the possibility that the “open” processes of multilateral organizations like
the AIA and ISO would not be so successful if they relied upon
agreement, rather than input, among all the parties involved. This
is presumably why the Standards Development Organization
Advancement Act imposes the additional requirement of a balance
of interests in the process.
These issues of control and balance are relevant both for antitrust
and contract law. Antitrust law sometimes relies on balance as an
indicator that the standardization provides procompetitive benefits
overall, not just for one group.241 And contract law is based on the
235. See supra Part II.B.1 and text accompanying notes 143-52.
236. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
238. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); see supra notes 90-97 and
accompanying text.
239. Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 773-75.
240. Id.
241. For example, in the area of vertical restraints, antitrust law takes a permissive view
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concept of mutual assent, so balance is an even more fundamental
requirement there. It is important to note, though, that neither body
of law is likely to find either bilateral bargaining or multilateral
bargaining sufficient in every case. Each ensures only vertical
balance, which is to say that each ensures only that actors at two or
more levels favor the standardization.
Neither bilateral nor multilateral bargaining ensures horizontal
consent, which would require that all firms or consumers at each
level agree to the standardized terms. The concern here is that
particular terms will have different impacts on different parties at
the same level. It is exactly this sort of horizontal consent that was
the focus of the Court in Allied Tube and in the credit-card cases
previously discussed.242 In that respect, the consensus decisionmaking referred to by the Standards Development Organization
Advancement Act should involve not only parties from different
levels relative to the contract, but also parties differently positioned,
by size or other characteristics, at the same level. Only then can it
be ensured that the agreed-upon terms are truly beneficial.
3. The Business-to-Consumer Context
Consumer contracts present somewhat different problems than
do business-to-business contracts. Although consumers are both
the ultimate intended beneficiaries of antitrust law and the group
most in need of protection from oppressive contracts, it may be
difficult for them to play a role in negotiation of standard contracts.
As Perillo notes, the drafting mechanisms for standardization of
contracts do not often involve consumers, at least in the United
States.243
That is not to say that the need for consumer involvement is not
recognized. Some commentary focused on insurance contracts

of manufacturer-imposed restraints, in part because of an expectation that the manufacturer’s
interests are aligned with those of consumers. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 896-99 (2007).
242. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
243. Perillo, supra note 10, at 187 (“Consumers are notably absent from most of the
standard-form drafting organizations.”). In Europe, consumer associations play a more active
role. See Cafaggi, supra note 11, at 101, 106 n.37, 111 n.47.
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suggests that if consumers are involved in the process, the legal
treatment of a standardized contract may be more generous:
Antitrust analysis also considers the extent to which consumers have a voice in the standard setting process. Exclusion of
consumers may be evidence of anticompetitive intent. Allowing
policyholders to express their views on proposed coverages would
tend to dispel any inference of anticompetitive motive on the
part of an insurance rating organization’s members.244

But the cases cited in support of this passage really support only the
“considers,” “may be,” and “would tend to” claims. In other words,
the role played by consumer input is not at all clear.
The involvement of parties from both sides of the transaction may
be of even greater significance in Europe, where there is a broader
range of institutional mechanisms for addressing form contacts.
Consumer associations play a greater role in Europe, both in the
creation of standard-form contracts and in their monitoring and
challenge.245 On the other hand, one European commentator sees
potential problems in relying on consumer associations, comparing
the situation unfavorably to collective bargaining in the labor
context:
[A]t first sight, this [collective bargaining] model does appear to
fit well with consumer contracts as both the employment and
consumer contexts have in common a relationship of considerable inequality of bargaining power at an individual level.
However, where collective bargaining in employment works, it
does so owing to the existence of significant and well-organized
representative organizations for the weaker party (trade unions
or professional associations), whose representative credentials
are genuine and which have the time and resources to participate in the negotiation necessary to conclude collective agreements. For such a model to work in the consumer context,
similar sorts of associations would need to exist not merely at
the national level but also at the European level. While there are

244. ABA INSURANCE ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, supra note 99, at 70 (citing Moore v. Boating
Indus. Ass’n, 819 F.2d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am.
Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 294-95 (5th Cir. 1988); Klein Letter, supra note 216, at 1-3.
245. Cafaggi, supra note 11, at 101, 106 n.37, 111 n.47.
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indeed national consumers associations in the Member States,
their nature, aims, and ability to undertake such a task differ
very considerably.... [G]iven the other important roles which
these various consumers’ organizations need to play, it is not at
all clear to me that either the national or European associations
would possess the time, resources, or, indeed, specialist expertise to properly negotiate sets of effective and fair contract
terms.246

These points, of course, apply more broadly than just to Europe.
Just as courts and antitrust agencies need expertise and information about the business context of specific proposed standard
contracts in order to evaluate their effects, so too do consumer
groups. The same commentator draws an analogy to the role that
consumer groups play in the enactment of legislation, where they
may be better positioned than they are in contract negotiation.247
Thus, although the antitrust approach to standardization may focus
on procedure rather than substance, perhaps because of a lack of
substantive expertise, the evaluation of whether consumer interests
are adequately represented in negotiations may itself require
considerable expertise.
C. Adoption of Standardized Contracts
Neither of the two approaches to review of standardized contracts
discussed above—focusing on either contractual terms or the
bargaining process—provides particularly conclusive criteria. The
shortcomings of these approaches suggest that some attention to the
context in which the contracts are adopted could be valuable. More
specifically, this portion of the Article will focus on the constraints
to which those considering adoption of standardized contracts may
be subject. Both antitrust law and contract law are likely to consider
such constraints relevant, with antitrust law using context to
evaluate the likelihood of market power, and contract law using

246. Whittaker, supra note 65, at 158-59.
247. Id. (discussing the Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs, “which is an
association of national consumer agencies and associations, whose role is the representation
of consumers’ interests in the setting of EU policymaking”).

2010]

STANDARDIZATION OF STANDARD-FORM CONTRACTS

391

contract to assess consent. The constraints can come from two
different sources: the market and the State.
There are at least two ways in which market effects can constrain
the creation or adoption of a standardized contract. First, such
effects could be present in the market in which firms adopting
contracts operate. If competition among firms is sufficient in that
market, they may decline to adopt an oppressive or anticompetitive
contract. But it is also possible that other constraints, such as the
recognition of a standardized contract, may limit the ability of firms
to use an alternative.248
Second, there might be market pressures in the “standardization
market.” If competition works well in that market, a standardizing
organization might be forced to respond to customer demand for
satisfactory contract terms. It is not clear, though, that this
standardization market will function well unless there are multiple
organizations competing to provide standard contracts.
In a variety of areas, the market is apparently thought to be
insufficient to ensure procompetitive contract standardization. In
these areas—insurance is a notable example—the State reviews, or
at least has the power to review, standardized contracts. However,
the involvement of the State not only provides the potential for
substantive review, but also lessens the level of scrutiny that
competition law applies. Each of these topics is discussed below.
1. “Voluntary” Standards
For most standardized contracts, the adoption by individual
firms of the contract is, formally at least, voluntary. To be sure,
there are some instances in which there exists a legal requirement
that a particular form be used. In the United States, for example,
state regulators mandate certain standard contracts, such as those
for fire insurance.249 And a few states have certain restrictions on
248. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 53, at 729-36 (discussing the potential for the
“suboptimality” of terms in contracts based on the effects of “network externalities” during
the early adoption period of a new standardized contract in an existing industry). See
generally Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA.
L. REV. 757 (1995) for a discussion of network externalities and their impact on contracts.
249. 1 STEMPEL, supra note 88, § 2.05(D). When discussing standard contract policies
established by statute, Stempel notes that “[s]tate regulation imposing mandatory contract
terms is, thankfully, normally direct and easy to discern. For example, most state statutes
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the use of real estate contracts. Such cases are the exception,
though: for most standardized contracts, there is neither a state
requirement that the contract be used nor an explicit private
agreement to do so.
Because Section 1 of the Sherman Act250 and Article 101 of the
Treaty on the Functionality of the European Union251 condemn only
anticompetitive agreements, one could take the view that voluntary
adoption of a standard contract is a unilateral act and therefore
not subject to condemnation regardless of its competitive effect.
Some courts have in fact taken this approach in cases involving
standardization, though not contract standardization. For example,
in Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc., Judge
Easterbrook said that “when a trade association provides information ... but does not constrain others to follow its recommendations,
it does not violate the antitrust laws.”252
Schachar and the cases it cited, however, involved quality statements or certifications by standard-setting organizations regarding
products. In that context, buyers are free to accept or ignore the
organization’s views. More to the point, consumers have every
incentive to act independently, because an uncertified product may
in fact meet their needs. And in the certification cases the uncertified seller is generally one that is already committed to its (uncertified) product. One result of that commitment is that it is not free to
conform to the standard, except at considerable cost, but another is
that the uncertified product continues to be available to consumers
that choose it.
The contract standardization context is different. A standardized
contract serves as a uniformity standard, not merely as quality
information. As such, the availability of a standardized contract,
and others’ use of it, alters the competitive landscape, instead of
merely informing consumers about it. More specifically, once there
has been widespread adoption of a standardized contract, that
require insurers to use a standard fire insurance policy.” Id.
250. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
251. Treaty on the Functionality of the European Union, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115)
47, 88.
252. 870 F.2d 397, 399 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum
Inst., 846 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478,
486-89 (1st Cir. 1988)). It is worth noting here that the holding of Consolidated Metal
Products was not as categorical as Schachar would have had it.
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contract can provide advantages that are greater than the advantages to be obtained from using an alternative contract. Parties
might have preferred a different standardized contract, or standardization on different terms, but once the standardization process is
complete and the contract is adopted, their choices will no longer be
as free.253 “[T]he potential advantages of avoiding doubts about the
legal validity of terms might be sufficient to induce businesses to
adopt the model contract without any coercion.”254
The AIA’s standard contracts present a typical example. The use
of the contracts is voluntary, but as is the case with other standardized contracts, use of an alternative contract is more expensive.
As Professor Sweet says, “[c]ustomized contracts are much more
expensive than standardized contracts, such as those of the AIA.”255
Moreover, the AIA contracts themselves are difficult to customize,256
which makes it difficult to use only part of an AIA contract.257 Thus,
although use of the AIA contract is formally voluntary, it may be
necessary as a practical matter.
The same is true of the ISO’s insurance contracts. The cost to an
insurance company of creating an alternative policy contract and
getting that policy approved by all the states in which it operates is
likely to be prohibitive. And to use another contract would be to
sacrifice the actuarial data that the ISO provides for its contracts.258
As noted above, the Supreme Court has said that “[m]ost ISO
members cannot afford to continue to use a form if ISO withdraws
[or, in this case, does not provide] these support services.”259
Furthermore, even if users do not adopt the standard contract but
instead choose to deviate from it, the adoption of the standard could
253. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 53, at 729-36.
254. Collins, supra note 11, at 799; see also Choi & Gulati, supra note 10, at 1137-38 (“The
lawyers explained that it was impossible for standard-form clauses that were present in every
single sovereign debt instrument across the globe to change every time there was an aberrant
court decision. The issue was coordination. As a practical matter, the individual lawyer
proposing that his client alter a term in response to some interpretive shock faces the
possibility that no one else will change their terms. And the market is unlikely to accept a
non-standard term.”).
255. Sweet, supra note 77, at 325.
256. Id. at 335.
257. Moreover, the AIA contracts, like those of the ISO and other contract-standardization
organizations, are copyrighted, so modification would require permission of the organization.
258. See supra text accompanying note 90.
259. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 (1993).
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have significant competitive effects. There is a significant body of
contract scholarship, much of it following the work of Ian Ayres and
Robert Gertner on “penalty” default rules,260 that addresses the
significance of default rules. The basic insight in this work is that
penalty default rules can be used to induce contracting parties to
reveal private information.261 In the present context, the importance
of this insight is simply that default rules established by standardized contracts can have significant strategic implications, even if the
contract that is ultimately agreed upon deviates from those defaults.
As a result, the standardized contract need not be adopted to have
competitive effects; it need only create a default rule that causes the
revelation of competitively significant information.
The question, then, is whether agreement on a standardized
contract, without any formal agreement to adopt that contract,
should be viewed as an agreement in restraint of trade if that
contract is widely adopted, or even recognized as a default. In the
case of contracts that are already widely adopted, and where
continued adoption is assured, as with those of the AIA and ISO,262
it seems fair to treat an agreement on creation of the contract as an
agreement on adoption of it. More generally, the expectation of
uniform use of a contract seems a prerequisite for the collective
work of standardization. Indeed, it would make little sense for the
parties to engage in a standardization effort were their uniform use
of the contract not an assumption underlying that effort.
This assumption in fact corresponds to the standard approach
to inferring an agreement under the antitrust laws. Under that
approach, a party alleging agreement must show not only that
the parties behaved in the same way—in this case, by uniformly
adopting the contract—but also that their behavior made sense only
on the assumption that others would do the same.263 The effort
260. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992). Later work includes Barry Adler, The
Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999); Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999); Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps].
261. Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 260, at 127-28.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 255-59.
263. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222 (1939); Re/Max
Int’l v. Realty One, 173 F.3d 995, 1009-10 (6th Cir. 1999).
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required to standardize a contract is considerable. There would be
no reason for a firm to engage in that effort except on the assumption that there would be compensating benefits. Those benefits of
standardization arise from the widespread use of the standardized
contract.264 Therefore, the effort makes sense if the contracts are to
be adopted—as final contracts or as defaults from which negotiation
begins—uniformly, but does not make sense in the absence of an
understanding that they will all adopt the contract.265 From that, it
is reasonable to infer an agreement to adopt the contract. As the
Supreme Court said in Allied Tube, “[a]greement on a product
standard is, after all, implicitly an agreement not to manufacture,
distribute, or purchase certain types of products.”266
That inference would not apply, however, to those who were not
engaged in the standardization process, but merely adopted the
contract after the standardization. The adoption of the contract,
once it is standardized and adopted by others, would make sense
even individually, so no inference of agreement could be drawn from
the adoption. But the parties that were directly involved in the
standardization process could still be charged with the results of it.
If a standard is created that has sufficient power in the market so
that it must be adopted even by others, it seems reasonable to
charge its creators with causing those adoptions. This, then, leads
to the question of the incentives for users to adopt standardized
contracts, a topic which is taken up next.
2. Organizational Constraints
The manner in which a standard contract is created can have two
contrary implications with respect to parties’ incentives to use an
264. It is true that collaborative work to create a contract probably also produces a better
contract, but that would not likely be enough to justify the effort of standardization. In a
collaborative process like standardization, each party presumably has to be content with a
resulting contract that is not ideal from its individual point of view but is instead a balance
of collective interests. The compensation for the compromise, though, is exactly the
understanding that the contract will be used by all, which constitutes the agreement.
265. Engaging in standard-setting may also make relatively more sense for larger firms
than for smaller ones. See Schweitzer, supra note 202, at 32 (“The associated costs [of
standard-setting] may ... be more easily borne by larger players than by smaller ones.”). This
provides one possible explanation of why the results of some standardization efforts seem to
favor larger parties.
266. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 (1988).
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unpreferred contract. On the one hand, creation by an ad hoc group,
rather than an established organization, is likely to produce a more
favorable contract for the group.267 Indeed, an ad hoc group may
create a contract exactly because its members are not satisfied with
the contracts available from standard-setting organizations.268 That
in turn is likely to increase the incentive to use the contract, even
for nonmembers of the group. On the other hand, creation of a
contract by an organization is likely to entail its own incentives to
the extent that there are organizational or market sanctions for
nonuse. The issue here is not the nature of the bargaining process,
as above, but whether there are characteristics of the standardsetting arrangements that might make users not entirely free to
deviate from the standard contracts.
There appear to be relatively few public examples, at least in the
United States, of creation of a standardized contract by an ad hoc
group, or, in other words, of creation of such contracts outside a
preexisting organizational structure. Interestingly, though, several
Supreme Court cases—Paramount Famous Lasky,269 Catalano,270
and Hartford Fire Insurance271—did involve what appear to be ad
hoc groups that created form contracts or at least agreed on
particular terms.272 It may be that such cases, when they become
public, are more likely to be litigated than perhaps more competitively ambiguous organizational standard-setting.
As described in Part III.C.1, parties that enter into an ad hoc
arrangement to standardize a contract are likely to use that
contract.273 After all, they are unlikely to join the effort to create the
contract if they do not intend to use it, at least if there are not any
other benefits to joining the group engaged in drafting the contract
in which case the effort might better be viewed as organizational.
267. There still will be compromises within the group, of course. See supra note 264. This
difference between ad hoc groups and established standard-setting organizations (SSOs) is
echoed in differences between SSOs. Professor Schweitzer notes that “[i]n SSOs with closed
membership or restrictive membership rules, insiders may have incentives to collude against
outsiders,” but that “[i]n recognized SSOs with open and broad membership, collusive
strategies will be more difficult to organize.” Schweitzer, supra note 202, at 32.
268. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
269. 282 U.S. 30 (1930); see supra note 116.
270. 446 U.S. 643 (1980); see supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
271. 509 U.S. 764 (1993); see supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part III.C.1.

2010]

STANDARDIZATION OF STANDARD-FORM CONTRACTS

397

Moreover, they are likely to act on the understanding that the other
parties to the arrangement will also use the standardized contract.
It seems fair, then, to characterize the agreement to standardize the
contract as also constituting an agreement to use it. Even straightforward price-fixing cartels usually have no formal enforcement
mechanism to ensure compliance with the agreement.274
More often, standard contracts are created by preexisting organizations. In that case, there are other incentives at work. The
organization may have rules that require members to conform to its
contracts or sacrifice any benefits of membership.275 If not, users’
decisions to adopt the standardized contract could be characterized
as voluntary. Even in the absence of such rules, the organization’s
imprimatur may in itself carry some force in the market. The extent
to which these factors impose pressure on members then depends on
how those advantages of conforming compare to the benefits of
using an alternative contract.
It is also possible for standard contracts to be created by organizations independent of the market participants. In that case, there is
unlikely to be an antitrust issue, because if the organization is truly
independent, there would be no agreement on the contract among
competitors. In that case, the only additional incentive for parties
to use the form contract—beyond the value of the contract itself—is
the market power of the approval or imprimatur of the organization
that creates the contract. Moreover, there is less incentive for a
group that is not itself active in the market to create a contract
skewed in favor of one party. Creation of standard contracts by truly
independent entities appears to be quite rare, however.
Thus we have three possible sources of form contracts, each of
which creates different incentives for use of the form contract. The
primary incentives for compliance are presumably either the
benefits of the contract itself, in the form of its reduction of transaction costs or other procompetitive benefits, or in the form of the
advantages of collusion. The table below presents the other incentives offered by form contracts:
274. See Christopher R. Leslie, Judgment-Sharing Agreements, 58 DUKE L.J. 747, 812
(2009) (“Most aspects of agreements among price-fixing firms are not enforceable in court ...
[but] the mere presence of these kinds of agreements has served to stabilize many a cartel in
the past.”).
275. See supra Part II.B.3.
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Incentives for Using Form Contracts
Formal compliance
mechanisms

Ad hoc
arrangement
Organization of
contracting
firms
Independent
organization

breach-of-contract
action?
membership sanctions

none

Market compliance
incentives
(in addition to
benefits of contract)
none
market significance of
organizational approval
market significance of
organizational approval

Of course, the pressure to use a particular standardized contract
would be lessened or eliminated if there were multiple such contracts available. That would likely require competition among
multiple standard-setting organizations, which appears to be
uncommon. Although competing standards are sometimes available,
as in the trucking example discussed earlier,276 that is the exception.
As suggested above, one reason for this may be the network effect
created by standardization.277 In addition to this demand-side effect,
there are presumably supply-side economies of scale in the creation
of standards.
The problem can be illustrated by a European Commission case
that sought to ensure the possibility of standards competition.278 In
SCK, which was discussed briefly above,279 the Commission required
not only that the certification process be “completely open, independent and transparent”280 but also that in order not to restrict
competition, the system must “provide[ ] for the acceptance of

276. See supra Part II.B.1.
277. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
278. Interestingly, one commentator states that “the EU Commission has disfavoured
competition for standards in the marketplace, both in the form of a unilateral development
of standards and in the form of private standard-setting consortia.” Schweitzer, supra note
202, at 30.
279. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
280. Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf v.
Comm’n, 1997 ECR II-1739 para. 125.
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equivalent guarantees from other systems.”281 That is, apparently
the standard-setting organization was required not only to make
determinations of whether its standards were met, but also to
accept the “equivalent” certifications of competing certifiers. The
Court of First Instance confirmed that this criterion was “pertinent,”
observing that the limitation of approval to SCK’s own evaluations
“cannot be objectively justified by an interest in maintaining the
quality of the products and services ensured by the certification
system.”282
Although SCK involved a certification scheme, not the creation of
a standardized product or contract, there are important parallels
that pose problems for the European approach. The cost of developing standards must be recouped by a standard-setting organization,
and if others could free-ride on that standard-development effort,
the incentive to create standards would be lessened. It is not clear
how one would develop an “equivalent” certification system without
relying on the original system. Or, to put it another way, how could
SCK certify that its standards were met by another “equivalent”
system unless the other system’s criteria were at least as strict?
Therefore, it seems it would be possible simply to wait until the
original certifying organization developed market acceptance for its
system and then create an equivalent system. Perhaps the Commission, and the Court of First Instance, would have allowed SCK to
charge for granting its certification to those presenting equivalent
certifications, but that is not clear.283
The creator of a standard contract, like the creator of certification
criteria, makes an investment that it will not want to share. Indeed,
the European Commission has stated that it “doubts that parties
that invest vast amounts to develop and update STCs [standard
terms and conditions] will be eager to share the final result at no

281. Id. para. 141.
282. Id. para. 137.
283. It is possible that the concern of the Commission and the court was not so much about
access of competing certifiers but about SCK’s requirement that, to remain certified, firms
were required only to deal with other certified firms. That is, the concern might have been not
so much about competition in the certification market as with competition in the market for
services that were (sometimes) certified. The Court of First Instance also said that “the failure
to accept equivalent guarantees offered by other systems protects certified firms from
competition from uncertified firms.” Id.
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cost with competitors.”284 For that reason, creators of standard
contracts often protect them with copyright.285 There is therefore no
way for a competing organization to create “equivalent” contracts.
A competing organization could create a different standardized
contract, but then the benefits of uniformity would be lost to users
of the original and competing contracts. Moreover, it is likely that
network effects would soon cause the contract with the larger
installed base to eliminate the other.
In the United States, there has been little focus on this issue,
or even on the possibility of competing standard-setters more
generally.286 The issue is addressed, though, in the European
Commission’s guidelines for horizontal cooperation agreements.287
The Commission observes that one of the relevant markets for
agreements on standards is “the service market for standard
setting, if different standard setting bodies or agreements exist.”288
The guidelines state that “[t]he existence of a restriction on
competition in standardization agreements depends upon the extent
to which the parties remain free to develop alternative standards.”289 Furthermore, “[a]greements that impose restrictions on
marking of conformity with standards, unless imposed by regulatory
provisions, may also restrict competition.”290
The first freedom, the right to produce a competing standard, is
uncontroversial, but the second, the right to produce products that
conform to preexisting standards, is more doubtful, as suggested
above.291 Particularly for a copyrighted standard contract, it is not
clear that allowing competing versions, which presumably would
have to use the same language, is feasible. In this regard, a
284. Commission of the European Communities, First Annual Progress Report on European
Contract Law and the Acquis Review, at 10-11, COM (2005) 456 final (Sept. 23, 2005),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/
progress05_en.pdf.
285. See supra note 257.
286. For example, this is not a topic discussed in the ABA STANDARDS HANDBOOK,
referenced supra note 14.
287. Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to
Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2001 O.J. (C 3), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2001:003:0002:0030:EN:PDF.
288. Id. para. 161.
289. Id. para. 167.
290. Id.
291. See supra Part II.B.
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copyrighted contract is similar to a patent-protected product
standard. On the other hand, copyright’s merger doctrine, which is
intended to allow copying when an idea can be expressed only in one
way, and its scènes à faire doctrine, which can allow use of others’
material when choices are externally constrained, could come into
play here.292 At least after a standard contract becomes accepted,
the only way to express its provisions and preserve the benefits of
uniformity is likely to be to use the same language.
An illustrative copyright case is Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc.293 Mitel,
the copyright owner, had created a series of codes to control its
telephone call controller, and these codes were the subject of its
copyright claim.294 Iqtel introduced a competing controller but
“[b]ecause Mitel controlled a large share of the call controller
market, Iqtel concluded that it could compete with Mitel only if its
[Iqtel] controller were compatible with Mitel's controller.”295 Iqtel
therefore copied Mitel’s codes. Nevertheless, the district court and
court of appeals rejected Mitel’s request for a preliminary injunction
for several reasons, among them the scènes à faire doctrine:
We have extended this traditional copyright [scènes à faire]
doctrine to exclude from protection against infringement those
elements of a work that necessarily result from external factors
inherent in the subject matter of the work. For computer-related
applications, these external factors include hardware standards
and mechanical specifications, software standards and compatibility requirements, computer manufacturer design standards,
industry programming practices, and practices and demands of
the industry being serviced.296

These statements appear equally applicable to standard contracts. The Mitel court said that “the scenes a faire doctrine
identifies and excludes from protection against infringement any
expression whose creation ‘flow[ed] naturally from considerations

292. See Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyrights in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193,
215-21 (2007).
293. 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
294. Id. at 1369-70.
295. Id. at 1369.
296. Id. at 1375.
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external to the author’s creativity.’”297 Contract language, which is
constrained by legal requirements, would seem to fit within this
class of expression. Moreover, another factor that has been considered in finding material uncopyrightable is “compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is designed to
operate in conjunction.”298 This, too, would presumably be relevant
to standard contractual language, which necessarily uses earlier
verbal formulations.299
3. The State and Contract Standardization
The State can play a significant role in the standardization of
contracts. When the State takes part, in some fashion, in the
process, there are two contrary implications. On the one hand, state
approval or review of the resulting contract, if it involves meaningful evaluation,300 can help ensure a fair and procompetitive contract.
On the other hand, though, state involvement typically lessens the
degree of antitrust scrutiny of any private standardization activity,
at least if the State actively supervises any private standard-setting
activity,301 and in Europe can also affect the contract analysis.302
In the United States, the most significant state involvement with
contracts standardization is in the insurance industry. Most insur297. Id. (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03[F] (1997)).
298. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992).
299. These copyright doctrines are echoed by antitrust law limits on the control of
interfaces, which are the analog here to standardized contracts. See Herbert Hovenkamp,
Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 B.C. L. REV. 87 (2007).
300. For example, a clear relation between the use of expertise and coregulation between
private parties and the state “combines binding legislative and regulatory action with actions
taken by the actors most concerned, drawing on their practical expertise. The result is wider
ownership of the policies in question by involving those most affected by implementing rules
in their preparation and enforcement.” Commission White Paper on European Governance, at
21, COM (2001) 428 final (July 25, 2001), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf.
301. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992). In Europe, the standard is lower,
requiring only that “the State has not waived its power to make decisions of last resort or to
review the implementation of a decision.” Schweitzer, supra note 202, at 44.
302. If the standardized contracts are produced by a trade association on the basis of a
formal delegation by a public authority, the anticompetitive nature of those contracts can be
scrutinized only by reference to the state delegation, which involves a type of scrutiny
different from that which would apply to an independent initiative by the associations or a
group of market players.
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ance policies must be approved by state insurance regulators. As
noted above, much of the work of generating the insurance policy
forms is done by the ISO.303 The policies are subject to review and
approval by state regulators, but the quality of this review is
questionable. A recent study indicated that the regulators are often
underfunded: “Over half of the states are more than 40% below the
minimum needed to fully protect consumers.”304 Moreover the
McCarran-Ferguson Act,305 which exempts the business of insurance
from federal antitrust law, does not establish any other forms of
oversight by the federal government of state regulation.306
Perhaps this concern would be lessened if the ISO’s deliberation
and selection process were open, but it is not:
For obvious reasons, ISO and insurers resist turning over this
so-called drafting and regulatory history. Even if a policyholder
is able to obtain the information, ISO typically succeeds in
obtaining a protective order precluding dissemination of the
materials to third parties. Accordingly, much of this story
remains hidden to the public, known only to those policyholders
and their law firms that have prevailed in the requisite discovery battles.307

The justifications for state regulation of insurance contracts and
for the drafting efforts that the states largely leave to the ISO focus
primarily on contract and consumer-protection concerns particular
to insurance transactions.308 But U.S. contract law has itself
developed a variety of doctrines, many of them specific to insurance
law, that greatly lessen the problems at which self-regulation is

303. See supra Part II.B.3.
304. Press Release, Consumer Fed’n of Am., State Insurance Department Resources Have
Risen Over Last 10 Years But Are Still Inadequate To Fully Protect Consumers (Oct. 22,
2009), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/stateinsurance.pdf (quoting J. Robert Hunter, Dir.
of Ins., Consumer Fed’n of Am.).
305. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2006).
306. See Press Release, supra note 304.
307. 1 STEMPEL, supra note 88, § 4.05[A] (3d ed. 2006) (quoting KALIS ET AL.,
POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE § 1.02).
308. For example, in the mid-to-late 1970s, states imposed readability requirements for
insurance contracts on the grounds that they were necessary to protect consumers. See John
Aloysius Cogan, Jr., Readability, Recurring Use, and the Problem of Ex Post Judicial
Governance of Health Insurance Policies, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 93, 119 (2010).
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purportedly addressed. Moreover, some states require by law that
certain provisions are part of the insurance contract, even if those
provisions are not in the written agreement.309
As a result, it is possible that there is little gained in preventing
bad terms through regulation by state agencies. If so, then by
promoting standardization when bad terms would be unenforceable
in any event, the state regulatory agency may serve to eliminate
good terms. This is especially so because innovative, consumerfavorable terms are likely to come from small, innovative insurers,
which are exactly the ones that would find it difficult to afford the
requirements for state review of new contracts.
The European Commission has a somewhat similar approach to
the insurance industry. Specifically, the Commission has a block
exemption from antitrust law for form insurance contracts.310 The
block exemption, like the McCarran-Ferguson Act in the United
States, does not really address whether agreement on contracts is
likely to make them more or less consumer-friendly. Although the
block exemption, among other things, prohibits insurers from
agreeing on policies that combine coverage for multiple risks if those
risks do not always appear together,311 for the most part it does not
in itself attempt to define what terms might be undesirable.
The block exemption, however, does have one dramatic difference from the McCarran-Ferguson Act.312 It provides that the
Commission can withdraw the exemption “at the request of a
Member State or of a natural or legal person claiming a legitimate
interest” if standard terms “contain clauses which create, to the
detriment of the policyholder, a significant imbalance between the
rights and obligations arising from the contract.”313 It is interesting
that, although the block exemption is addressed to competition law,
the language of this provision is one of contract law.314
309. 1 STEMPEL, supra note 88, § 9.01.
310. Commission Regulation (EC) No. 358/2003 of 27 February 2003, On the Application
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements, Decisions, and Concerted
Practices in the Insurance Sector, art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 53) 8-16.
311. Id. art. 6, § 1(c).
312. The EC block exemption also requires that the agreements must be public and freely
available. Id. art. 5, § 1(c). In the United States, in contrast, the ISO’s policies are not
generally available, at least free of charge. See supra Part II.B.3.
313. See Commission Regulation, supra note 310, art. 10, § b.
314. See generally Cafaggi, supra note 11.
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In this respect, another DOJ business review letter is suggestive.
In 1993, the ISO requested review by the DOJ of the ISO’s marketing of a product that would provide premium-comparison reports for
different insurance companies.315 This is the sort of information that
can facilitate price-fixing, and indeed the DOJ stated that “[t]he
Department would be concerned about the anticompetitive impact
on insurance rates of the creation by competitors of a database that
permits the detailed comparison of premiums currently being
charged.”316 The DOJ, however, said that because it appeared that
the proposal was part of the “business of insurance” and because it
was regulated by state law, it was exempt from antitrust scrutiny.317
Although this is not the sort of conduct that would be covered by the
European Commission block exemption in any case, it does illustrate that even if an antitrust exemption may often be appropriate
in the insurance context, the desirability of applying antitrust law
should at times overcome the exemption.
IV. ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO STANDARDIZED CONTRACTS
The preceding discussion does not provide firm recommendations
for reviewing standardized contracts. Firm recommendations are
likely to be difficult given both the mix of costs and benefits that can
be created by standardization of contracts, and the fact-specific
nature of the relevant antitrust and contract doctrines. The
difficulty is exacerbated by the scarcity of cases, which limits the
information available on some relevant issues, such as standardization procedures. In any event, the purpose of this Article is more to
call for greater attention to standardized contracts than to propose
specific legal standards. For that reason, the paragraphs below focus
more on possible costs of standardization than on benefits, which
are generally more obvious.
Although both contract law and antitrust law are relevant,
antitrust law seems the more appropriate means for scrutinizing
315. Letter from Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Joel M. Cohen, Esq. (Jan. 25, 1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
busreview/211724.pdf.
316. Id.
317. Id.; cf. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (providing a
different definition of the “business of insurance”).
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standardized contracts. It is the standardization of such contracts—that is, the horizontal agreement on them—that is the
primary concern, and such horizontal agreements among competitors are the focus of antitrust. Contract law’s focus is more vertical,
on the agreement between the contracting parties, which usually
are not competitors.318 Therefore, contract law typically will not
address the fact of standardization directly, though it may be
relevant to contract doctrine.319
A. Incentives and Effects
From an antitrust perspective, the same approach discussed
above for inferring an agreement among those involved in standardsetting can also be used as a basic indicator of competitive effect.
That is, the incentives of the parties are evidence not only of
whether they agreed to adopt the standardized contract, but also of
what effect they anticipated from the contract. The standardization
effort is costly,320 so participation in it indicates that some sort of
return on investment is expected. A consideration of the likely
source of that return is therefore desirable. One possibility—the
anticompetitive one—is that the standardization will constitute or
facilitate collusion. To avoid an inference of that possibility, it seems
that the standard-setters should be able to offer an alternative
explanation of how their costs will be recovered.321
A key point is that the usual procompetitive justification for
standardization efforts—the creation of cost savings—is not obviously valid. Assuming that the parties continued to compete on
price, it is not clear why they would not compete away any savings.
Moreover, because the investment in standardization would be a
fixed cost, pricing based on marginal costs would not necessarily
allow recovery of that investment. To the extent, however, that the
standardization facilitates collusion on price, return on the stan318. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
319. See infra text accompanying note 336.
320. See supra Part III.B.
321. This shifting of the burden to the standard-setters would not be uncontroversial, but
in its standard-setting cases the Supreme Court has appeared willing to require some showing
from the standard-setting entity. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492, 505-06 (1988) (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 142-43 (1961)).
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dardization investment would not pose a problem. Hence, there
needs to be some explanation for how the parties expect to profit, or
at least break even, on the standardization effort.
One might think that the same point would apply to product
standardization, but the circumstances are different there. At least
for interoperability standards, product standardization enlarges
the market for each seller by making interoperability with more
other products possible.322 Moreover, the products may be those of
vertically related parties, as when standardization enables a
computer to work with more peripherals. Therefore, the standardization is likely to improve the competitive position of at least some
sellers.323 Although the same sort of market expansion is possible for
standardized contracts, it seems unlikely that contract negotiation
costs pose the same sort of obstacle to additional transactions that
can be posed by incompatible hardware.
Moreover, in the product standardization context, it is likely that
sellers seek to be involved in the standardization effort to ensure
that they are not disadvantaged by adoption of a standard to which
they are not well-positioned to conform. Again, though, it is not
clear that this same incentive exists for contract standardization, at
least to the same extent. It seems unlikely that users of a particular
contract differ dramatically in their abilities to conform to a
particular standardized version of the contract. And that is particularly so because adoption of the new contract would not require a
new drafting effort—analogous to a redesign effort for product
standardization—on the part of the individual firms, but could be
accomplished by adoption of the standardized contract.
But there might be some circumstances in which the expense of
standardizing a contract could make sense, even for individual
firms. For example, suppose that there were several large firms in
the market, each of which used its own contract. And suppose that
customers were comfortable using those contracts, but that small
322. Drew Andison, Dir., Standards and Conformance Policy Section, Dep’t of Indus. Sci.
& Tourism, Presentation to the Australian APEC Study Centre: Product Standards and Their
Impact on International Trade (Dec. 5-6, 1996), available at http://www.apec.org.au/docs/
citer10.htm.
323. Some sellers, that is, are likely to believe that they could do better than their
competitors at selling to the new customers made available by the standardization. And even
if they had no such expectation, they might well believe that a larger market, even if
competitive, is better than a smaller one.
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firms seeking to enter the market encountered resistance from
customers who did not want to familiarize themselves with the
entrants’ contracts. In that case, one could imagine that a standardization effort would make sense, at least for the new entrants. By
standardizing, they could make customers more likely to switch to
them. But the same reasoning would make the incumbent firms
reluctant to engage in standardization, so it is not clear that this
could be a source of many standardization efforts.
In any event, this picture of individual firms deciding whether to
participate in an effort at standardization is somewhat misleading.
Most efforts at standardization, at least of contracts, are undertaken
by trade associations.324 Trade associations can in theory solve the
collective-action problem that otherwise would create incentives not
to participate and instead to free-ride on the efforts of others. At
least if the association does the work of standardization, or if it pays
for the participation of its members, there is no need for the
association members to recoup the costs of standardization, because
those costs are paid by the association. On the other hand, if the
standardization effort is still a product of volunteer efforts by
members, the same recoupment problems exist.
B. Terms and Severability
Part IV.A suggests that a simple “interoperability” cost-reduction
justification for contract standardization may not always be applicable. If not, then the specific standard terms adopted become
more significant. It might be, that is, that the parties to the standardization recoup the costs of the standardization effort through
more favorable terms, rather than through lower costs of contract
drafting. More specifically, if the interoperability benefits of standardization are likely to be competed away, and therefore do not
necessarily provide an explanation for the standardization, then the
terms themselves may provide that explanation.
However, the antitrust assessments of standardized contracts
sometimes seem to focus on the efficiency of standardization of the
contract as a whole rather than on particular terms.325 Antitrust
324. See supra Part II.B.
325. This seems to have been the case in the DOJ review of the ATA contract, in which the
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doctrine has means for reviewing particular restraints in the
context of broader activities,326 and the Supreme Court has on
several occasions condemned individual restraints that were part of
large packages.327 Indeed, the Court did so with regard to a standardized contract in Paramount Famous Lasky,328 and courts should
continue to examine the individual terms of standardized contracts.
In antitrust analysis, this issue could be presented in the context
of ancillary-restraint doctrine, which is a commonly used approach
to joint ventures like standard-setting.329 Under that doctrine, it is
not sufficient for a restraint—in this case, the standardization—to
accomplish a lawful purpose; the restrictions imposed must also be
ancillary to that purpose. In the contract-standardization context,
the implication of this doctrine is that even a standardized contract
that reduces costs or improves quality overall should not include
provisions that do not serve those purposes, or that impose restrictions that are not necessary to serve those purposes.
In this respect, standardized contracts are again different from
standardized products. For standardized products, it will often be
difficult to pick and choose among the product characteristics
specified by the standard; more often, the standardized characteristics will work together, so to eliminate one may be to eliminate the
benefits of the standardization. The individual provisions of a
standardized contract, however, will generally be severable. Indeed,
the contract itself is likely to provide that if any provision is
invalidated, the remainder of the contract will survive. Hence, there
is no reason not to examine each contractual provision carefully.
Substantive scrutiny poses its own problems, however. Most
importantly, if sellers agreed on a term that disadvantaged buyers,
is it likely that the sellers would compete away any harm in lower
prices? If so, even burdensome terms might not result in an
anticompetitive effect overall. One answer, given by the Supreme
agency seems not to have focused either on the disagreement regarding broker liability or on
the remedial provisions. See supra note 150 and accompanying text and note 153.
326. See infra text accompanying note 329.
327. See Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); see also
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (holding NCAA’s plan for televising college
football games restrained competition in the relevant market).
328. Paramount Famous Lasky, 282 U.S. at 41-44. See supra note 116.
329. A similar approach is recognized by courts that ask whether a restraint is the least
restrictive alternative available to accomplish its procompetitive goals.

410

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:327

Court in Catalano, is that the absence of negative effects overall
does not matter, because elimination of competition on any term is
an antitrust violation.330 Other courts might be more flexible, but for
price competition to eliminate any harm from agreement on other
terms, two conditions must be met. First, of course, there must be
vigorous price competition. Although such competition may often
exist, the fact of standardization may suggest some degree of
collusion, and in fact will make collusion easier. Second, buyers, or
other parties harmed by the agreed-upon term, must be uniform;
otherwise, competition along the single price axis cannot eliminate
harm to all of them.331
Although these antitrust concerns regarding horizontal competition are not the primary focus of contract law, they are also relevant
there. As described above,332 the contract tests for unconscionability
and unfairness of terms in standardized contracts can take into
account the market within which standardization takes place. In
that way, contract law’s focus on vertical interparty consent and
bargaining power is related to antitrust market power. In principle,
competition should be a force that pushes firms toward contractual
terms that advance fairness and consumer welfare. Although there
are seldom competing standard-setting organizations, contract
law could consider some of the same factors that antitrust law looks
at in determining whether adoption of standards is voluntary:
network effects, the composition of the standard-setting body, and
the meaningfulness of any state review of the contract.
Conversely, contract law’s emphasis in unconscionability on
burdensome terms and bargaining power can inform the antitrust
analysis of whether there has been an agreement. The imposition of
unfair or burdensome terms by multiple sellers suggests that any of
those sellers could attract buyers by not imposing those terms,333
330. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (per curiam). See supra
text accompanying note 121.
331. In theory, the sellers perhaps could serve different buyer groups at different prices,
but it is not clear that this would be practical in many cases, because of difficulties both in
identifying the different buyer groups and in limiting transactions to particular groups.
332. See supra text accompanying note 158.
333. That is so, at least, if the seller is not compensated for its lost or forgone sales by
benefits produced by the terms that burden buyers. If that were the case, though, there would
presumably be some evidence that sellers would impose similar terms unilaterally, without
standardization.
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which in turn is the sort of “plus factor” from which one could infer
an agreement among the sellers.334 It is generally considered
reasonable to infer an agreement where firms behave in a way that
makes sense only if they all behave similarly.335
It is also possible that terms could be sufficiently desirable that
it would be reasonable to trust their standardization to private
agreement, and here again reference to contract law could be useful.
Although contract law generally will have no occasion to review
desirable terms, a contract might be standardized in order to
eliminate undesirable terms. As described above,336 antitrust law is
typically skeptical of agreement on terms, even where the parties
defend those terms as beneficial. But if terms have been recognized
as unfair under contract law, self-regulatory standardization that
eliminates such terms might be permissible.
C. Trade Associations as Standard-Setters
The severability of contracts also suggests that the procedural
approach to review of standardization suggested by the Supreme
Court in Allied Tube may not be appropriate for contract standardization.337 The procedural approach necessarily takes the contract
as a whole, but it might be that the desirability of individual provisions is not guaranteed by procedures that are satisfactory as a
whole. Given the complexity of many standardized contracts, a
procedural approach may not reveal all of the competitive implications of the contract, particularly when not all interested parties are
able to make their views heard.338 And despite the misgivings
expressed above, courts may be better equipped to review the costs
and benefits of standardized contracts than they are to make the
corresponding inquiry regarding more-typical product standards.
334. See 1 JONATHAN M. JACOBSON ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 11 (6th ed. 2007)
(“The plaintiff typically must prove other facts and circumstances (often referred to as ‘plus
factors’) in combination with conscious parallelism to support an inference of concerted
action.”).
335. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222 (1939); Re/Max
Int’l v. Realty One, 173 F.3d 995, 1009-10 (6th Cir. 1999).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 175-77.
337. See generally Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
338. See supra text accompanying note 222 (discussing possible harm to third parties to
standardized contracts).
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Even from a general procedural perspective, though, contract
standardization differs from much product standardization. Many,
if not most, product standards are established by organizations that
are devoted primarily to standard-setting. Such organizations may
be accredited by the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI).339 The requirements for accreditation applied by ANSI are
the same ones—“openness, balance, consensus and due process”340—
that define a “voluntary consensus standards body” under the
Standard Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004.341
As a result, there is at least some reason to expect that these
organizations will provide unbiased fora for standard-setting.
It is all the more significant, then, that standardized contracts are
more often adopted not by standard-setting entities, but by trade
associations, where it is not clear that these criteria are met.
Indeed, none of the primary standardizing entities discussed in this
article—the ISO, AIA, or ATA—is on the ANSI list of “accredited
standards developers.”342 As described above, there are significant
concerns about “openness, balance, consensus, and due process” in
these organizations,343 so more attention to the these criteria,
especially given their adoption specifically for antitrust law in the
Standard Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004,
would be appropriate.
D. Modification of Standardized Contracts
A focus on individual contract terms rather than on standardized
contracts as a whole also suggests that the question of whether
adoption of a standardized contract is voluntary may be too broad.
Instead of asking only whether users are under pressure to adopt
the contract, as was discussed above,344 the inquiry should also ask
339. Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., Domestic Programs (American National Standards)
Overview, http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/domestic_programs/overview.
aspx?menuid=3 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
340. Id.
341. 15 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(8) (2006).
342. See Am. Nat’l Standards Inst., ANSI Accredited Standards Developers, http://www.
ansi.org/Standards_activities/domestic_programs/accreditation_as_developer/
asd.aspx?menuid=3 (follow “Standards Developers” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
343. See supra Part III.B.
344. See supra Part III.C.1.
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whether users are able to change individual undesired terms. If
such alterations of individual terms are possible, users may be able
to gain the advantages of standardization while preserving the
flexibility to compete.
This sort of flexibility is especially important where potential
users of the contract are differently positioned in some way. For
example, as discussed above,345 a contract term may affect small and
large firms in different ways. If the term can be altered in ways that
suit both types of firms, though, there need not be any anticompetitive effect. The question, then, is whether such alteration is
feasible. If alteration of a particular standardized contract is
common, it should be taken as evidence that any anticompetitive
effect from the standardization is unlikely,346 at least with respect
to the terms that are altered. Even if alteration is not common, it
might be that other evidence, such as testimony from parties to the
contract, would suffice to infer that terms are used because they are
desirable, not because they must be.
It is also worth noting, though, that if alteration of particular
standardized terms is frequent, it is reasonable to ask why those
terms are standardized at all. It might even be reasonable to ask
whether, if little attention was paid in the standardization effort to
whether uniformity would be desirable for particular terms, there
are other terms that parties would prefer to alter but do not. That
would particularly be so if the use or nonuse of the standardized
terms were correlated with user characteristics like size. In that
case, it might be that it would be too burdensome to renegotiate all
the unfavored terms.
***
In sum, there are two ways in which contract standardization
differs from product standardization, and each suggests that greater
scrutiny of standardized contracts could be appropriate. First, it is
not clear that the incentives for standardizing contracts are as likely
to derive from procompetitive effects as are those for standardizing
products. Second, standardized contracts can be scrutinized, and if
necessary invalidated, term-by-term in a way that standardized

345. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
346. That is so, at least, in the absence of any countervailing evidence, such as that
alteration is expensive, either in attorneys’ fees or in customer resistance.
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products cannot. Each of these considerations suggests that, as
compared to product standardization, contract standardization could
reasonably be subject to greater, not less, antitrust attention.
CONCLUSION
There is surprisingly little scrutiny of standardized contracts,
either under antitrust law or contract law. Antitrust defers to efficiency justifications for standardization with little effort to determine whether individual terms are desirable. And contract law
appears not to have attributed any significance to standardization,
even though it exacerbates at least the procedural concerns that are
part of unconscionability analysis. It is even possible, though there
is no particular evidence of this, that each body of law gives less
scrutiny to standardized contracts because they are subject to
control by the other.
Of course, it is also possible that very few standardized contracts
present problems, either of fairness or competitiveness. But questions about the contracts discussed in this Article suggest that there
are more such problems than have been recognized. Many standardized contracts are created under circumstances that put control of
the process in the hands of parties on one side of the contract.
Although that need not result in an unbalanced contract, a significant amount of commentary points to imbalance in these contracts
and suggests that there is reason for greater scrutiny.
How that scrutiny should balance competition and contract
concerns is not entirely clear, but this Article has provided some
suggestions. Each body of law should retain its traditional focus,
which in antitrust law is primarily horizontal competition and in
contract law is vertical consent and agreement between the parties.
But contract law could look to antitrust law approaches and market
conditions to help determine whether true consent to a standardized
contract is present. And antitrust law could look to contract law’s
assessment of the fairness of terms to help draw conclusions regarding both the manner in which standardization occurred and
possible anticompetitive agreements. In these ways, the relevance
of both bodies of law can aid, rather than hinder, the review of
standardized contracts.

